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Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries 
Howard A. Shelanski† 
J. Gregory Sidak†† 
The landmark Microsoft case raises challenging questions concerning 
antitrust remedies. In this Article, we propose a framework for assessing the 
costs and benefits of different remedies, particularly divestiture, in monopoli-
zation cases involving network industries. Our approach can assist a court or 
enforcement agency not only in analyzing the welfare effects of divestiture, 
but also in choosing more generally among alternative kinds of remedies. The 
framework would, for example, apply to a court’s choice between damages and 
injunctive remedies or between behavioral injunctions and structural injunc-
tions. After developing our framework, we apply it to the divestiture proposals 
made by the government and others in the Microsoft case. We argue that those 
proposals leave open important questions that must be answered before dives-
titure can be shown to be either the best remedial alternative or to create likely 
net gains in economic welfare.  
INTRODUCTION 
The late William F. Baxter went to Washington to fight monopo-
lies in 1981. By the time he returned to teaching at Stanford Univer-
sity three years later, the Bell System had been restructured from one 
company into eight.
2 Baxter’s handiwork was the most ambitious 
antitrust divestiture since the government’s breakup of Standard Oil 
in 1911.
3 As architect of the AT&T divestiture, Baxter believed that a 
theory of antitrust liability should map coherently on to a proposed 
remedy. The remedy should end the conduct that is alleged to have 
harmed consumer welfare and that forms the basis for a finding of 
liability. The remedy in a public antitrust action should do no more 
and no less. Regardless of liability, if “there is no assurance that ap-
propriate relief could be obtained,” then the government must ques-
tion the value to consumers of prosecuting the antitrust case at is-
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sue.
4 Accordingly, on the same day that he announced the AT&T di-
vestiture, Assistant Attorney General Baxter terminated the gov-
ernment’s other major monopolization case—the one against Amer-
ica’s second titan of information technologies, IBM.
5 Elegantly sim-
ple, Baxter’s principle concerning the efficacy of antitrust remedies 
deserves the eponym “Baxter’s axiom.”
6 It would serve well as a 
Hippocratic oath for antitrust enforcers and jurists. In fact, Baxter’s 
insight is really an application of basic principles of welfare econom-
ics to the questions of when to bring antitrust cases and how to re-
solve them in a socially beneficial manner. 
About a year into the Department of Justice’s pursuit of AT&T, 
Bill Gates and Paul Allen founded the company that became Micro-
soft Corporation.
7 Since that time, Microsoft has grown to a market 
capitalization of approximately $340 billion
8 and today symbolizes 
how a “New Economy” has risen from the advent of affordable, 
ubiquitous personal computing and the phenomenal growth of the 
Internet. The company is also a post-industrial giant that has been 
alternately lionized, vilified, and, ultimately, investigated and prose-
cuted by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. It 
took less than fifteen years for a startup from the West to replace the 
century-old Bell System as the principal target of public antitrust 
scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether Microsoft will become the 
government’s trophy for wise enforcement, like the Bell System per-
haps, or its haunting nemesis, like IBM. Baxter taught us that the 
government’s proof of liability does not suffice to predict its success 
in crafting a remedy. 
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On November 5, 1999, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued 
his findings of fact in the civil antitrust case of United States v Micro-
soft Corporation.
9 On November 19, 1999, he appointed as a mediator 
in the case Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit.
10 Following weeks of settlement discussions, 
Microsoft and the government returned to the courtroom on Febru-
ary 22, 2000, to present closing arguments.
11 Judge Jackson likened 
Microsoft to the Standard Oil trust, and one state attorney general 
said that any remedies ordered in the case must be “drastic and far 
reaching.”
12 Judge Jackson issued his conclusions of law on April 3, 
2000, finding Microsoft liable for violating the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.
13  
When Judge Jackson ruled for the government, the task before 
the trial court changed from determining liability to identifying a 
suitable remedy. Following Baxter’s axiom, any remedy should ad-
dress the conduct for which Microsoft was found liable and advance 
economic welfare at the lowest possible social cost. The problem is a 
challenging one. As expressed by Timothy Bresnahan, the Stanford 
economist then serving as the Antitrust Division’s chief economist, 
the government’s case against Microsoft can be likened to a dog 
chasing a fire truck: what is he supposed to do once he catches it?
14 
Well, the dog caught the truck, and the question of what to do was 
no longer hypothetical.  
On April 28, 2000, the government offered its answer: separate 
Microsoft’s operating system business from its applications business 
and, among other things, order a divestiture of the firm into two in-
dependent companies. Four distinguished economists—Robert E. 
Litan of the Brookings Institution, Roger G. Noll of Stanford Univer-
sity, William D. Nordhaus of Yale University, and Frederic Scherer 
of Harvard University—filed an amicus brief the same week which 
argued that the government’s proposed remedy was inadequate and 
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would be hard to administer.
15 They observed that the Microsoft case 
presents important and novel questions in terms of fashioning a 
remedy:  
[T]his Court will establish in the process of setting a remedy in 
this matter the contours of relief in monopolization cases where 
the defendant’s value arises primarily from intangible assets in 
the form of intellectual property rather than the tangible capital 
assets characteristic of such prior major monopolization cases 
as Standard Oil, Alcoa, and AT&T. In essence, this case pro-
vides an important test of how antitrust law and remedies 
should be applied in the “New Economy,” where informational 
capital is the scarce and precious asset and physical assets are 
relatively minor and hardly unique.
16 
These economists argued that aggressive divestiture remedies are 
more justified in markets characterized by intellectual rather than 
physical capital. Microsoft predictably responded that a lesser set of 
remedies would suffice,
17 and other equally eminent economists, in-
cluding Paul Krugman of MIT, warned of the unintended conse-
quences of a divestiture remedy.
18 That divestiture was the only 
practical remedy.
19 The trial court accepted the government’s argu-
ments and ordered Microsoft broken up into two companies.
20 
The purpose of this Article is to establish principles for answer-
ing the remedial question faced by the court and for assessing Judge 
Jackson’s decision to order a divestiture of Microsoft. In Part I, we 
explore differences between forms of economic competition—
particularly network competition and Schumpeterian rivalry—
relevant to antitrust analysis in dynamic industries. Those two con-
cepts of competition are i mportant to understanding conflicting 
views of the Microsoft case. 
Microsoft’s opponents have argued that the existence of “net-
work externalities” creates market conditions that justify antitrust 
intervention against aspects of Microsoft’s pricing, product introduc-
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tion, product integration, and acquisition strategies. A network ex-
ternality, or “network effect,” exists when the value of a product or 
service increases with the breadth of demand for that product or 
service. The typical example is the telephone system, which becomes 
more valuable to any given subscriber as other people subscribe and 
become available to communicate with the subscriber. As the bene-
fits offered by one network grow, so too do the costs to consumers of 
choosing, or switching to, a rival offering. Competition in network 
markets can therefore take on a winner-take-all dynamic with com-
petitive strategies geared towards gaining an early lead in market 
penetration. 
“Schumpeterian rivalry” is a distinct vision of competition that, 
though not mutually exclusive of network competition, may have 
implications for the durability of network monopolies and for anti-
trust enforcement in network markets. In this view, which some crit-
ics of the government’s case against Microsoft contend is applicable 
to software markets, firms compete through technological innova-
tion to achieve market dominance, but dominance that is continually 
challenged and subject to displacement by subsequent innovations. 
As with network competition, this form of rivalry may have an all-
or-nothing flavor. Winners enjoy a p eriod of dominance, during 
which they receive above-cost prices that include the returns neces-
sary to induce risky investment in product innovation, but are sub-
ject to being supplanted by rivals in a later innovation cycle.  
In Part II, we draw from principles of antitrust jurisprudence 
and microeconomics to propose an approach for choosing appropri-
ate remedies in monopolization cases involving network industries. 
We present a three-step test for assessing the welfare effects of a 
remedy, which can also be used to compare the relative costs and 
benefits of available remedies. Step one is to evaluate whether the 
static (short-term, holding technology constant) efficiency conse-
quences of a proposed remedy will yield a net gain. Do the gains in 
allocative efficiency (that is, reductions in price and increases in out-
put) exceed the losses in productive efficiency (that is, ability to re-
duce production costs), if any, associated with a particular remedy? 
If so, then step two is to compare the static efficiency gains from the 
first step with any effects that the remedy is likely to have on dy-
namic (long-term, with technological change) efficiency. Examples of 
dynamic efficiency include innovation that reduces production costs 
or develops new products and services for consumers. If the net gain 
is positive, then step three is to evaluate the remedy in terms of its 
enforcement costs, broadly defined. The optimal remedy is the one 
that produces the greatest overall efficiency gains net of enforcement 
and administrative costs.  100  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
In Part III, we describe the government’s basic theory of liability 
in the Microsoft case. We then examine Judge Jackson’s findings of 
fact and his conclusions of law. 
In Part IV, we use the axiomatic approach developed in Part II 
to evaluate the structural remedies proposed to the court in the Mi-
crosoft case. We focus our analysis on the vertical and horizontal di-
vestiture remedies requested by the government and by some amici 
curiae. We also discuss how the analysis would extend to other 
structural and behavioral remedies such as compulsory licensing, 
line-of-business r estrictions, prohibitions on product integration, 
disclosure of the application programming interfaces (“APIs”), and 
limitations on contractual terms with customers. We conclude that 
the divestiture proposals before the court do not contain the ele-
ments necessary to show either that divestiture is likely to create net 
social b enefits or, even assuming it would, that it would do so at 
lower cost than alternative forms of relief.
21 
In Part V, we examine whether, as has been widely suggested, 
the 1984 divestiture of AT&T provides the proper blueprint for for-
mulating remedies in the Microsoft case. We conclude that it does 
not on multiple grounds. 
In Part VI, we pose, but leave for others to answer, two more 
general questions concerning the process of selecting a remedy in 
the Microsoft case. 
I.  DYNAMIC COMPETITION: NETWORK EFFECTS AND SCHUMPETERIAN 
RIVALRY  
As discussed in the Introduction to this Article, two different 
ways of u nderstanding market structure and performance have 
emerged in the Microsoft case, as well as in numerous other antitrust 
and regulatory contexts in recent years: network competition and in-
novation-based, or “Schumpeterian,” competition. The adoption of 
one or the other of those frameworks can be of great practical conse-
quence. High profit margins might appear to be the benign and neces-
sary recovery of legitimate investment returns in a Schumpeterian 
framework, but they might represent exploitation of customer lock-in 
and monopoly power when viewed through the lens of network eco-
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nomics. Market dominance in the former case is likely to be temporary, 
but in the latter to become entrenched. The issue is particularly com-
plex because, in network industries characterized by rapid innovation, 
both forces may be operating and can be difficult to isolate. Neither the 
Schumpeterian nor the network externalities framework justifies anti-
competitive behavior, but each might yield different conclusions about 
what constitutes evidence of such behavior and what the likely conse-
quences of such behavior will be. These factors are, in turn, directly 
relevant to the choice of an appropriate remedy where antitrust viola-
tions have occurred.  
A.  Network Effects 
The various government complaints against M icrosoft have 
built an account of antitrust liability upon the theoretical research on 
network effects. Critical to the government’s theory in the Microsoft 
cases has been the idea that computer software, like telecommu-
nications, is a good that relies upon an interconnected web of fixed 
infrastructure. The economic properties of such network goods and 
their effects on market behavior have been an important part of the 
justification for antitrust intervention against some of Microsoft’s 
pricing, product introduction, product integration, and acquisition 
activities. 
1.  Network externalities. 
For current purposes, the most important result from the litera-
ture on network economics is the creation in some product markets of 
network externalities.
22 Network externalities are benefits to society 
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that accrue as the size of a network grows: An individual 
consumer’s d emand to use (and hence her benefit from) the 
telephone network, for example, increases with the number of other 
users on the network whom she can call or from whom she can 
receive calls.
23 Just as one consumer’s demand to use the telephone 
network increases with the number of other users on the network, so 
also the demand for a particular word processing or spreadsheet 
program increases as it becomes more commonly used or more 
compatible with other programs. 
If the network characteristic of a good is significant, then con-
sumers will be attracted to the firm with the largest market share. In 
the absence of interconnection or compatibility, consumers will re-
ceive a larger network benefit from choosing the good or service that 
has the largest number of other users. For example, consider the “in-
stant messaging” systems offered by various Internet service pro-
viders. There is currently no legal requirement that subscribers to 
one provider be allowed to send instant messages to subscribers of 
another. Any provider can keep its messaging system proprietary. In 
the absence of interconnection, it is costly for consumers to subscribe 
to multiple services, and consequently consumers might find it 
comparatively beneficial to purchase only the service offering the 
largest instant-messaging network externality. The history of local 
telephone service in the first decades of the twentieth century, dur-
ing which AT&T refused to connect with independent competitors, 
illustrates how such a dynamic can lead to monopoly. 
2.  Lock-in, path dependence, and barriers to entry. 
A second important theme in the literature on network effects 
concerns lock-in of customers to a particular network and the related 
possibility of technological path dependence.
24 The existence of net-
work externalities can confer benefits on the first firm in a market to 
gain a significant early lead in market penetration, especially if pro-
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duction exhibits increasing returns to scale. That early lead can have 
a decisive effect on the market’s structure well into the future be-
cause consumers are attracted to the good or service that offers the 
largest network benefit, and that benefit then only becomes larger 
and more attractive to later consumers. One consequence is that con-
sumers can become “locked in” to a particular network. In the ab-
sence of interconnection or interoperability among competing net-
work goods or services, switching from the market leader to a rival 
will entail at least a short-term loss in network benefit. This lock-in 
effect, in turn, makes entry or expansion by rivals more difficult be-
cause they cannot attain a critical mass of customers. The network is 
thus said to “tip” to the incumbent, which creates a barrier to entry 
in the costs to rivals of overcoming the network benefits associated 
with the incumbent’s product.  
To enter, a firm must have either a sufficiently better product that 
consumers find it worthwhile to incur switching costs (such as loss in 
network benefits and retraining costs) or a sufficient cost advantage 
that it can compensate consumers for those switching costs through 
lower prices. To avoid being in such a catch-up position, firms will 
have the incentive to gear competitive strategies towards capturing an 
early lead and to continue innovating to stay ahead of potential rivals 
who might “leapfrog” its incumbent lead position. The race to gain 
and to maintain dominance in a network market might also, of course, 
provide motives to engage in anticompetitive conduct, as the trial 
court found Microsoft to have done. 
A large network externality can determine the path of technological 
change in a market in much the same way it can determine market 
structure. The market leader will set the technological standard￿for 
example, Microsoft’s Windows operating system￿even if other 
technological standards are superior in some economic or engineer-
ing sense. Subsequent innovation in the market, and in markets for 
complementary products, might thus follow the path set by the 
technology that first takes a meaningful lead even if that path is not, 
ex post, seen to be the optimal one. Path dependency and lock-in 
can, of course, occur for reasons other than network externalities (for 
example, the costs of learning to use a competing product). More-
over, network externalities need not create lock-in. If switching to a 
new system is low cost or if it is cheap to use multiple systems, then 
entry is feasible and the market may support multiple networks of 
ranging sizes. And some scholars have disputed the validity of the 
empirical cases used to document the existence of path-dependent 
outcomes.
25 The theoretical case for lock-in and path dependency in 
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network markets has nonetheless been an important motivation for 
the government’s antitrust e nforcement to constrain Microsoft’s 
dominance in operating systems and its growth in complementary 
software applications. 
A consequence of network externalities and lock-in effects is 
that antitrust enforcement in network markets becomes complicated. 
On one hand, if anticompetitive conduct is not detected and stopped 
early, dominant market share may “tip” in favor of the bad actor. 
The harm to consumers will at that point be done and might not be 
able to be undone without imposition of yet additional costs on con-
sumers. On the other hand, distinguishing anticompetitive actions 
from beneficial competitive conduct can be difficult when firms are 
competing not just for market share, but for commercial viability 
and the market i tself. For example, aggressive pricing that looks 
predatory in a conventional market might constitute a rational com-
petitive strategy in a market where one’s future existence depends 
on early penetration. Network dynamics may thus raise the risks of 
both action and inaction by antitrust authorities. In the 1994 Tunney 
Act proceeding concerning Microsoft, Nobel laureate Kenneth J. Ar-
row observed: 
The analysis of the Department of Justice and the amici curiae 
brief agree that the software market is peculiarly characterized 
by increasing returns to scale and therefore natural barriers to 
entry. Large-scale operation is low-cost operation and also con-
veys advantages to the buyer. Virtually all the costs of produc-
tion are in the design of the software and therefore independent 
of the amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero. 
There are also fixed costs in the need to risk large amounts of 
capital and the costs associated with developing a reputation as 
a quality supplier. Further, there are network externalities, in 
particular, the importance of an established product with a 
large installed base and the related advantage of a product that 
is compatible with other complementary applications.
26 
Given this confluence of economic forces, Professor Arrow warned 
that “a rule of penalizing market successes that are not the result of 
anticompetitive practices will, among other consequences, have the 
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effect of taxing technological improvements and is unlikely to im-
prove welfare in the long run.”
27 
B.  Schumpeterian Rivalry 
An alternative, and sometimes complementary, explanation for 
the performance of dynamic markets is that firms compete through 
innovation for temporary market dominance, from which they may 
be displaced by the next wave of product advancements.
28 The dis-
tinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter coined the phrase “creative 
destruction” to express the idea that the pursuit of market power is a 
creative and dynamic force that “incessantly revolutionizes the eco-
nomic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, inces-
santly creating a new one.”
29 Hence the labeling of such innovation-
based competition as “Schumpeterian.” Though he died decades be-
fore the advent of personal computing, Schumpeter saw such rivalry 
as “the essential fact about capitalism.”
30 Creative destruction means 
that a firm’s acquisition or possession of market power may be fleet-
ing. In the most famous passage of Schumpeter’s classic discussion on 
creative destruction, he wrote: 
[S]ince we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what 
happens in any particular part of it—say, in an individual con-
cern or industry—may indeed clarify details of mechanism but 
is i nconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy 
acquires its true significance only against the background of 
that process and within the situation created by it. It must be 
seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it 
cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hy-
pothesis that there is a perennial lull. 
But economists who, ex visu of a point in time, look for example 
at the behavior of an oligopolistic industry—an industry which 
consists of a few big firms—and observe the well-known moves 
and countermoves within it that seem to aim at nothing but 
high prices and restrictions of output are making precisely that 
hypothesis. They accept the data of the momentary situation as 
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if there were no past or future to it and think that they have 
understood what there is to understand if they interpret the be-
havior of those firms by means of the principle of maximizing 
profits with reference to those data. The usual theorist’s paper 
and the usual government commission’s report practically 
never try to see that behavior, on the one hand, as a result of a 
piece of past history and, on the other hand, as an attempt to 
deal with a situation that is sure to change presently—as an at-
tempt by those firms to keep on their feet, on ground that is 
slipping away from under them. In other words, the problem 
that is usually being visualized is how capitalism administers 
existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it cre-
ates and destroys them.
31 
Unless government imposes artificial barriers to market entry,
32the 
incumbent will be repeatedly challenged and eventually supplanted 
by actual and potential competitors. Schumpeterian competition can 
thus be viewed as occurring sequentially over time rather than si-
multaneously across a market. That version of competition, Schum-
peter explained, “commands a decisive cost or quality advantage 
and . . . strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of 
the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.”
33 
Such competition, moreover, “acts not only when in being but also 
when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it at-
tacks.”
34  
There are two important implications for antitrust enforcement. 
First, in markets characterized by Schumpeterian rivalry, pricing at a 
level higher than that found under the theoretically simplistic case of 
perfect competition is not only legitimate, but also necessary to in-
duce investment in developing and deploying new technology. Sec-
ond, in such markets periodic dominance by one firm or a few firms 
may be symptomatic of healthy, innovation-based competition and 
may be subject to displacement, even when goods with network ex-
ternalities are at issue. Creative destruction thus implies that antitrust 
policy based on static analysis of today’s market conditions can be 
misleading and, over time, injurious to consumers. 
An example of a view of competition that discounts Schumpete-
rian rivalry is found in the testimony of Professor Paul Romer, the 
                                                                                                                                                      
31  Id at 83–84. 
32  State governments traditionally imposed entry barriers by granting monopoly tele-
phone franchises. The federal government similarly forbade AT&T from entering the com-
puter business. See United States v Western Electric Co, Inc, 1956 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 68,246 at 
71, 138 (D NJ).  
33  Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 84 (cited in note 28). 
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Stanford economist who testified in April 2000 on the government’s 
behalf in the remedies phase of the Microsoft case: 
Microsoft has harmed the innovative process because it has lim-
ited competition, and competitive markets are, on balance, the 
best mechanism for guiding technology down a path that bene-
fits consumers. No system of comprehensive central planning, 
neither one controlled by a government, nor one controlled by 
the managers of a single firm, can hope to be as robust and reli-
able a mechanism as competition among many actual and po-
tential firms for purchases by final users.
35 
What is most significant about this passage is that Romer considers 
actual competition for market share to be essential for innovation. It 
may be true, although the empirical literature is highly ambiguous, 
that competition is “on balance” beneficial for technological devel-
opment. But whether that assertion is true and which form of com-
petition it is true for—actual and/or Schumpeterian—depend on the 
particular industry at issue. And Romer does not make clear how 
the form of competition that he advocates—multiple firms operating 
in simultaneous rivalry—is applicable to software markets that ar-
guably contain significant network properties. That competition may 
take the form of pressure, from fringe firms and potential entrants, 
that does not necessarily produce multiple firms that divide market 
share at any given time is implicitly rejected by Romer. That omis-
sion is all the more conspicuous when one juxtaposes the preceding 
passage against the following passage from the same testimony by 
Romer: 
In coming years, portable devices, wireless communications 
and voice recognition may obsolete many deeply embedded as-
sumptions about when, where, and how users access digital in-
formation. At the same time, improvements in the bandwidth 
of fiber optic data communications networks and the extension 
of these networks ever closer to the desktop may narrow the 
gap between the capacity of the pipe that connects two different 
                                                                                                                                                      
35  Declaration of Paul M. Romer at ¶ 14, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 
98-1232 (D DC filed Apr. 27 2000) (“Romer Declaration”). Romer, however, then supports this 
general statement with the following example from the telecommunications industry: “Before 
the breakup of AT&T, engineers described the advantages of having a single firm that pro-
duced all the telephone desksets that connected to the telephone network. Since the breakup, 
consumers have benefited from the wider range of choice and more rapid innovation in the 
handsets that competition made possible.” Id. That assessment incorrectly ascribes the deregu-
lation of customer premise equipment (“CPE”) to the antitrust divestiture of AT&T, rather 
than to deregulatory initiatives of the Federal Communications Commission that were wholly 
independent of the antitrust case. See, for example, Robert W. Crandall, After the Breakup: U.S. 
Telecommunications in a More Competitive Era 34–35 (Brookings 1991). 108  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
computers and the pipe that connects components located in-
side the case of a single computer. Either one of these develop-
ments, and especially the two of them together, could lay the 
foundation for new software i nnovations as powerful as the 
browser and the Web.
36 
These developments would seem to provide the conditions for a 
Schumpeterian version of competition. Yet, Romer does not analyze 
the costs and benefits of the government’s proposed remedies in the 
Microsoft case in terms of their effect on such a sequential process. 
It would ignore recent economic history to presume that Micro-
soft is immune from being leapfrogged and displaced from its 
dominant market position. In hindsight it may seem hard to under-
stand how the Justice Department could have allowed itself to be-
come a latter day Captain Ahab, spending thirteen years in pursuit 
of a whale named IBM.
37 Though IBM was the undisputed market 
leader in mainframe computers in the 1960s, by the time the gov-
ernment dropped its antitrust case in 1982, the mainframe had al-
ready been harpooned by the personal computer. And in that mar-
ket, despite its brand name and experience, IBM emerged as just one 
of several strong competitors. In a competitive economy, Schum-
peter observed, businesses will be enticed to compete vigorously for 
“spectacular prizes” despite the fact that “they receive in return only 
modest compensation.”
38 In the analogous context of designing effi-
cient regulatory regimes (as opposed to efficient remedial regimes 
under antitrust law), the “most important” caveat for policymakers 
is that “static models cannot be confidently relied on for quantitative 
guidance in the real, dynamic world.”
39 
In 1992, William Baxter said of the then-current rumors of a possi-
ble government antitrust action against Microsoft, “[t]here are a lot of 
companies bellyaching that Microsoft is too effective a competitor. 
Let us pray that that is not seen as a bad thing to be.”
40 Speaking in 
1995, the man who vigorously pursued AT&T but gave up the gov-
ernment’s chase of IBM saw “strong parallels between IBM and Mi-
crosoft.”
41 Baxter viewed the success of both IBM and Microsoft in 
Schumpeterian terms: 
                                                                                                                                                      
36  Romer Declaration at 16 ¶ 31 (cited in note 35). 
37  See Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E. Greenwood, Folded, Spindled, and 
Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM 1 (MIT 1983). 
38  Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy at 73–74 (cited in note 28). 
39  Richard Schmalensee, Good Regulatory Regimes, 20 RAND J Econ 417, 435 (1989). 
40  John Schwartz and Anita Amirrezvani, Does Bill Play Fair, Newsweek 58, 59 (Nov 30, 
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Each of the firms got out in front technologically, each was 
enormously successful and d elivered incredible value to the 
American people over a period of years and, as a result, won a 
very large market share . . . . It’s terribly important that compa-
nies not be given a signal that success and capture of large mar-
ket share will bring antitrust attack . . . . The social value of 
what IBM and Microsoft delivered is far greater than any harm 
they could have done by anticompetitive practices.
42  
Baxter similarly observed in 1997 that in the New Economy “com-
panies will compete for markets, rather than in markets.”
43 Speaking 
specifically of the threat to Microsoft’s Windows from Sun Microsys-
tems’s Java computing language, Baxter observed that there will be 
“a series of companies leapfrogging one another,” such that “[t]he 
worst thing we can do is weaken the incentives to be the successful 
frog.”
44  
This admonition from the architect of the AT&T divestiture, 
though made before the government’s evidence against Microsoft 
was revealed in court, remains pertinent. It counsels all concerned to 
ask, given the defendant’s liability, how the remedy phase in Micro-
soft or any antitrust case might be resolved in a socially beneficial 
manner.
45  
II.  A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DESIGNING EFFICIENT  
ANTITRUST REMEDIES 
In this Part, we address the following question: When is perma-
nent injunctive relief—and divestiture in particular—the appropriate 
remedy in an antitrust case? Antitrust remedies can be classified into 
two general categories: damages and injunctions. Injunctive reme-
dies can be further classified into behavioral remedies and structural 
remedies. Behavioral injunctions bar a defendant firm from engag-
ing in particular actions that a court has deemed anticompetitive (or 
in the case of a consent decree, actions that the defendant has agreed 
to alter even if it has not conceded them to be illegal). In the context 
of Microsoft, a behavioral remedy might prevent the firm from con-
ditioning the distribution of Windows on anything other than the 
                                                                                                                                                      
42  Id. 
43  Russ Mitchell and Marianne Lavelle, Road Runner v. Coyote: As Microsoft Case Shows, 
Markets Move Faster than Justice, US News & World Rep 58, 59 (Dec 15, 1997) (quoting Bax-
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44  Id (quoting Baxter). 
45  Professor Baxter passed away November 27, 1998. See Michael M. Weinstein, W. F. 
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ability of an original equipment manufacturer (“OEM”) to pay for 
the license and promise to respect Microsoft’s intellectual property.  
Although behavioral remedies alter the actions that the defen-
dant and, as a consequence, competitors in the relevant market may 
pursue, they do not directly alter the structure of the relevant market 
or the distribution of the assets needed to compete among rival 
firms. In contrast, structural remedies affect market structure di-
rectly by redistributing competitive assets in the relevant market. 
The redistribution can be accomplished by breaking the defendant 
company into two or more pieces and reorganizing the company’s 
assets (which can include employees) among the two or more newly 
created competitors. Alternatively, these assets can be redistributed 
by requiring the defendant to sell or otherwise to make available to 
its competitors some input, right, or facility that will allow rivals to 
compete in the market. Compulsory licensing of intellectual prop-
erty and mandatory access to essential facilities are general exam-
ples. One structural remedy that has been proposed for Microsoft 
would require the company to auction its Windows source code to 
competitors.
46  
The remainder of Part II is organized as follows. In Part II.A, we 
describe a test for evaluating and comparing the economic welfare 
consequences of alternative injunctive remedies. In Part II.B, we ex-
amine existing antitrust jurisprudence to see how it relates to our ef-
ficiency-based test and to see whether the case law establishes addi-
tional principles that must be applied. We find existing antitrust law 
to offer surprisingly little guidance on remedies and to highlight the 
need for an axiomatic approach to the problem.  
A.  An Economic Welfare Test for Designing Optimal  
Injunctive Remedies  
From an economic standpoint, the normative goal of law and 
public policy should be to increase s ociety’s overall wealth. This 
economic welfare criterion implies that a policy can impose costs so 
long as it creates offsetting benefits. A much more stringent standard 
of economic welfare, and one that hence provides a much weaker 
mandate for public policy, is Pareto efficiency, which holds a policy 
to be efficient only if it makes some parties better off without mak-
ing any party worse off.
47 In the absence of compensating side pay-
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York University. See Joel Brinkley, A Microsoft Remedy: Antitrust Experts Offer Prescriptions, NY 
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47  For a discussion of Pareto efficiency, see Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 225–26 
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ments from the winners to the losers, few policies would qualify as 
Pareto efficient. A more practical formulation is that a policy can 
impose costs on some parties so long as the policy beneficiaries can 
(at least theoretically) compensate the losers and still be better off. 
That principle is often referred to in the literature as the Pareto crite-
rion, and is what we will mean here when we use “Pareto” descrip-
tively.
48 Policymakers in several branches of economics, from the en-
vironment
49 to international trade,
50 have employed the Pareto prin-
ciple as a starting point for policy formulation. It is similarly appli-
cable to the choice of legal remedies. 
Much of the literature on optimal remedies concerns designing 
awards to the breached-against party of a contract, to a victim of a 
tort, or to a victim of a crime. In general, the literature is concerned 
with designing a remedy that induces an efficient level of economic 
activity or an efficient level of resource use. For example, in contract 
law, an optimal damages award is one under which breach will oc-
cur only if the overall gains to the parties are greater from breach 
than from performance.
51 An optimal penalty in a criminal proceed-
ing should minimize the social cost of crime, which equals the sum 
of the harms it causes and the costs of preventing it.
52 When consid-
ering the tradeoffs between types of criminal punishment, 
“efficiency r equires e xhausting the ability to punish criminals 
cheaply with fines before resorting to the costly punishment of 
imprisonment.”
53 Achieving efficiency—namely, minimizing the so-
cial cost of accidents—is also the aim in designing remedies for tort 
victims.
54 
                                                                                                                                                      
48  See, for example, William J. Baumol, Superfairness: Applications and Theory 7–9 (MIT 
1986).  
49  See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, 
and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles 5 (AEI 1996) (“A benefit-cost analysis is a useful 
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50  See, for example, Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: The-
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be shown to be an efficient substitute for explicit contract provisions governing the breach, 
whereas reliance damages and restitution damages may lead to an inefficient breach. See A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 29 (Little, Brown 1983). See also Rich-
ard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 130–50 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). 
52  In particular, society should invest in deterrence up until the point that the marginal 
social cost of deterrence equals the marginal benefit of deterrence. See, for example, Robert 
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 400–04 (Addison-Wesley 2d ed 1995). 
53  Id at 404.  
54  For example, it can be demonstrated that “a negligence rule with perfect compensa-
tion and the legal standard equal to the efficient level of care gives the injurer incentives for ef-
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Similarly, with respect to antitrust law, many commentators 
have a rgued that substantive liability rules should minimize the 
combined social cost of three variables: (1) the costs that arise when 
competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing behavior is deterred or 
mischaracterized as injurious to consumers; (2) the costs that arise 
when conduct injurious to consumers is not recognized as such; and 
(3) the costs of litigating claims under the rule.
55 If the probability or 
social cost of failing to recognize injurious behavior is small, then an-
titrust officials should employ a comparatively tolerant rule that 
minimizes the combined costs to consumers of false positives, false 
negatives, and the significant administrative costs under the Anti-
trust Division’s consent  decree process. If harms are likely to be 
great or identification of illegal conduct is easy, then a more strin-
gent per se rule may be appropriate. 
A similar kind of framework is useful in evaluating possible an-
titrust remedies. In the first part of this Section, we extend the Pareto 
criterion to the remedy decision by constructing a three-part frame-
work for evaluating the countervailing gains and losses in economic 
efficiency that a particular remedy might cause. We begin by de-
scribing three forms of economic efficiency: allocative, productive, 
and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is present when goods 
and services are allocated to the uses in which they have the highest 
value.
56 Productive efficiency is present when producers use goods 
and services in such a manner as to minimize costs, subject to tech-
nological constraints.
57 Dynamic efficiency refers to decisions made 
over time and includes efficiencies in investment and technological 
innovation.
58 When the government intervenes in markets in the 
name of increasing one form of efficiency, such as allocative effi-
ciency, it must take care that its actions not cause a larger sacrifice in 
another form of efficiency, such as productive or dynamic efficiency. 
Recognition of this tradeoff has been increasingly incorporated in 
antitrust jurisprudence since the 1970s.
59 
                                                                                                                                                      
55  See J. Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum L Rev 1121, 1144–45 
(1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev 263, 
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56  See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics 264 (McGraw-Hill 15th 
ed 1995). 
57  See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 104–06 (Basic 
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offs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18, 21 (1968). 
58  See J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory 
Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States 522 (Cam-
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In step one, the government bears the burden of demonstrating 
that, in a static framework, the gain (or recovery of what economists 
call the “deadweight loss” that comes from inefficient allocation) as-
sociated with an expected decrease in price exceeds any productive 
efficiency  loss caused by the proposed remedy.
60 To compute the 
gain from a horizontal divestiture in the current Microsoft case, for 
example, the government must estimate the extent to which an in-
creased number of operating system providers would reduce price.
61 
It must then examine whether divestiture, perhaps by changing the 
cost structure of production, would entail any productive inefficien-
cies. If the government cannot demonstrate that the net welfare 
change of a structural remedy is positive in a static sense, then that 
particular remedy should be withdrawn from consideration.  
If the gains in allocative efficiency exceed the loss in productive 
efficiency in a static sense, then the second step is to demonstrate 
that those static net gains in efficiency offset any loss in dynamic ef-
ficiency. Because the loss in dynamic efficiency would occur in the 
future, it must be discounted appropriately for comparison with any 
static net efficiency gains. If the government cannot demonstrate that 
the net welfare change of a structural remedy is positive net of the 
dynamic efficiency loss, then that particular remedy should be with-
drawn from consideration. Assuming that the net benefits of several 
structural remedies are shown to be positive in a dynamic sense, the 
decisionmaker should proceed to step three of the framework.  
The third step is to rank the set of Pareto-improving remedies 
according to their welfare impact. Although several structural reme-
dies might yield social benefits of the same order of magnitude, 
there might well be a wide variation in the enforcement costs associ-
ated with each potential remedy. Enforcement costs are the transac-
tion cost of antitrust remedies and should be broadly conceived to 
include administrative costs, monitoring costs, and the misallocation 
of resources associated with rent-seeking activity. Efficiency requires 
the rejection of a remedy if (1) the enforcement costs associated with 
that remedy exceed its welfare impact or (2) there exists another 
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bear the evidentiary burden. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evi-
dence, 51 Stan L Rev 1477, 1503–04 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Eviden-
tiary Law: An Underused Tool, an Underplowed Field, 19 Cardozo L Rev 1531, 1533 (1998); Bruce 
L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind L J 651, 674–75 (1997); Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian 
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Rev 137, 175–78 (1987); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 409–10 (1973). 
61  Some structural proposals, such as the auctioning of source code, may create more 
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remedy that would yield the same welfare gains but at a lower en-
forcement cost. A structural remedy that meets both criteria of our 
test—namely, the remedy is Pareto-improving net of enforcement 
costs and there does not exist a remedy that achieves the same effi-
ciency gains with lower enforcement costs—is the optimal remedy. 
Figure 1 summarizes the three-step decision framework described 
above. 2000]  Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries  115 
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1.  Step One: The injunctive remedy should produce a net gain 
in static economic efficiency. 
The first step in our test for designing an optimal antitrust in-
junction is to evaluate a proposed remedy’s net effect on static eco-
nomic efficiency (before considering the loss in dynamic efficiency 
and enforcement costs). We explain this analysis first for the case of 
structural remedies, and then for behavioral remedies. 
Antitrust laws in general and merger policies in particular are 
designed to promote consumer welfare. In the late 1960s, Oliver E. 
Williamson demonstrated the effects on consumer welfare of a 
merger that restricts output (by raising prices) and lowers marginal 
costs (by achieving certain productive efficiencies).
62 To defend a 
merger, according to Williamson, the merging parties must demon-
strate that the cost savings achieved through greater efficiencies ex-
ceed the deadweight loss (the amount between the increased market 
price and the price that consumers would be willing to pay for the 
lost output).
63 Cost reductions should be considered a social benefit, 
not just a private benefit to the parties, because the saved resources 
would be free to produce outputs elsewhere in the economy. More-
over, even under a merger to monopoly, a portion of the cost sav-
ings would be passed on to consumers.
64 According to Robert Bork, 
Williamson’s insight can be extended to any antitrust analysis: 
[Williamson’s framework] can be used to illustrate all antitrust 
problems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors 
involved, allocative inefficiency and productive efficiency. The 
existence of these two elements and their respective amounts 
are the real i ssues in every properly decided antitrust case. 
They are what we have to estimate—whether the case is about 
the dissolution of a monopolistic firm, a conglomerate merger, a 
requirements contract, or a price-fixing agreement.
65 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have 
come to embrace that test for both vertical
66 and horizontal merger 
analysis.
67  
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63  Id at 33–34. 
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sumer Viewpoint, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 707, 708–09 (1999).  
65  Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 108 (cited in note 57). 
66  U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines—1984 § 4.24 (Commerce Clearing House 
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Observers will note that the test for approving a horizontal 
merger can be inverted to provide the test for requiring a horizontal 
divestiture. Rather than asking the merging parties to demonstrate 
the net benefits of the merger, in the case of a forced divestiture, the 
government should demonstrate that structural relief increases net 
social gains. Because allocative i nefficiency and productive effi-
ciency are at the core of all antitrust problems, the government 
should bear the burden of proving the expected effect of a remedy 
on both. 
The test for divestiture is the inverse of the test for merger—
namely, a comparison of the efficiency gains and the deadweight 
loss imposed by the “anti-merger” caused by the order of divesti-
ture. In Microsoft’s case, it would be possible to calculate the mini-
mum price decline in the Windows operating system (and ultimately 
in personal computers) that must occur for the divestiture to be wel-
fare enhancing. To do so, the court would need to estimate the effi-
ciency gains that would be jeopardized if a divestiture were im-
posed. For any given level of efficiency loss, one could estimate the 
price decline that would need to occur conditional on different esti-
mates of the elasticity of demand for Windows and PCs. The result 
would be a matrix that showed a range of price declines.
68 The larger 
the range of necessary price declines over the relevant parameters, 
the greater would be the government’s burden of proving that its 
divestiture proposal was predicated on a credible model that pre-
dicted a substantial price decline following divestiture. 
A similar analysis should apply to behavioral remedies d e-
signed to restrict an upstream firm from exercising vertical control 
over a downstream distributor. Microsoft, for example, can be 
viewed as an upstream provider of operating systems, and OEMs, 
such as PC makers, can be viewed as the downstream distributor of 
the final product. The decision rule that should be employed by anti-
trust authorities regarding vertical control is, again, simple to state: 
Outlaw only those vertical restraints that reduce social welfare. The 
application of that rule to the specific competitive environment and 
the specific behavior in question, however, is likely to prove more 
difficult.
69 
                                                                                                                                                      
obstacle to most mergers. As a consequence, in the majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow 
firms to achieve available efficiencies through mergers without i nterference from the 
Agency.”). 
68  For a similar line of analysis, see Bernard J. Reddy, David S. Evans, and Albert L. 
Nichols, Why Does Microsoft Charge So Little for Windows? (Natl Econ Res Assocs 1999). 
69   To clarify, there are three elements in the chain here: manufacturer, operating system, 
and applications. Paul Krugman has argued that divestiture might create independently 
owned monopolies in the operating systems and applications markets. This would raise the 
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For example, Jean Tirole demonstrates that under simple mod-
els of vertical control where the downstream firm is assumed to 
have market power, “[social] welfare is unambiguously increased by 
the elimination of the double marginalization.”
70 Only one firm 
rather than two marks up the price of the upstream product, leading 
to a lower price and higher output. Other models of vertical control, 
including a model of downstream moral hazard and a model of in-
put substitution, are used to demonstrate that “vertical restraints 
need not be detrimental to welfare, even when they are meant to in-
crease monopoly profit.”
71 By contrast, some vertical restraints may 
be privately desirable (in the sense that they eliminate the distortions 
caused by dual ownership) and at the same time socially undesir-
able.
72 For example, in some cases when an upstream firm enters into 
a long-term contract with the downstream firms, Tirole demon-
strates that “private contracting yields too much foreclosure—i.e., 
too little competition—from a social viewpoint.”
73 With respect to 
policymaking, Tirole issues the following warning: 
At the same time, this conclusion [that vertical restraints can in-
crease or decrease welfare] puts far too heavy a burden on the 
antitrust authorities. It seems important for economic theorists 
to develop a careful classification and operative criteria to de-
termine in which environments certain vertical restraints are 
likely to lower social welfare.
74 
Until the theory has sufficiently advanced, antitrust enforcement 
will be prone to error in classifying vertical arrangements as either 
benign or anticompetitive.  
The prospect of erroneously proscribing a s ocially beneficial 
vertical arrangement through either structural or behavioral injunc-
tions is grounds for caution. Indeed, the evolution of antitrust juris-
prudence in the last twenty-five years towards fewer per se rules has 
                                                                                                                                                      
power, and thus there can be no risk of monopoly by the OEMs or double marginalization. 
There are various reasons (such as externalities and free-riding) why Microsoft’s restrictions 
on OEMs are procompetitive, but those reasons do not concern double marginalization. 
Rather, they pertain to traditional arguments of vertical foreclosure. 
70  Tirole, Theory of Industrial Organization at 177 (cited in note 23). For a nontechnical dis-
cussion of double marginalization in the context of the Microsoft case, see Krugman, Microsoft: 
What Next?, NY Times at A21 (cited in note 18); Krugman, Dirty Windows Policy, NY Times at 
Sec 4, 19 (cited in note 18). 
71  Tirole, Theory of Industrial Organization at 181 (cited in note 23). 
72  The Chicago School holds that there are no monopoly reasons for vertical control, and 
that observed vertical controls are meant to improve the efficiency of vertical relationships be-
cause the monopolist can always exhaust its monopoly power by raising its price. See, for ex-
ample, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 337–40 (cited in note 51). 
73  Tirole, Theory of Industrial Organization at 187 (cited in note 23). 
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been driven in part by the recognition that many vertical agreements 
previously viewed with hostility may be efficient and beneficial for 
consumers. Therefore, just as in the case of divestiture, the govern-
ment should bear the burden of showing that the particular ar-
rangement at issue forecloses too much competition from a social 
viewpoint. The first step in presenting its case should involve the 
best attempt to classify the alleged anticompetitive behavior based 
on the existing industrial organization literature. Next, the govern-
ment should demonstrate how related cases, either in theory or 
through evidence, have resulted in too much foreclosure. Finally, the 
government should attempt to quantify the gains enjoyed by the 
private parties to the contract. The mere existence of the voluntary 
contract is evidence that private gains were realized. If those gains 
outweigh the social costs, then the conduct leads to a net increase in 
efficiency and policy should emphasize getting the private parties to 
internalize the costs rather than give up the gains. 
a) Calculating the gain in allocative efficiency. To calculate the allo-
cative efficiency that would be restored by a divestiture, the gov-
ernment must accurately model the market environment in which 
the defendant firm operates. Without such a model, it is impossible 
to estimate the amount by which prices would decrease after the 
divestiture. The choice of economic model must be governed by a 
thorough understanding of the means by which firms compete in the 
relevant market. For example, the assumptions underlying the 
model must be justified with real-world data, including estimates of 
the relevant cost curves and price elasticities (that is, responses of 
supply and demand to changes in the price of a product or in the 
prices of that product’s substitutes and complements). Richard Pos-
ner has argued that estimation of the price elasticity of demand for 
the relevant product is the most critical aspect in determining 
whether a merger would be illegal.
75 In particular, he has explained 
that “the greater the elasticity of demand, the smaller the ratio of the 
monopoly to the competitive price, and the less monopoly power the 
firm will have.”
76 
Moreover, in certain competitive environments, such as those 
with consumption externalities,
77 it is not obvious that more com-
petitors would lead to lower prices. For example, in the case of oper-
ating systems, the more consumers use one standard, the more valu-
able that standard becomes for other consumers. If operating sys-
tems were competitively supplied, no individual producer would be 
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77  With consumption externalities, “the utility of one consumer is directly affected by the 
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able to capture the gains from “growing the market.” Hence, it is not 
clear whether prices in a competitive operating system market 
would be less than prices in a monopolistic operating system mar-
ket. Again, the government should explain with specificity the 
mechanism of any predicted price decline in a systematic fashion. 
For example, to estimate accurately the change in the price of 
Windows due to an injunctive remedy, it is necessary to assess the 
“benchmark price” from which prices would fall if a structural rem-
edy were imposed. As Steven Salop has demonstrated, the competi-
tive benchmark for analyzing both market effects and market power 
is the price “that would prevail in the absence of the alleged anti-
competitive restraint.”
78  
There are several pitfalls to be avoided when computing the 
price decline to be expected from a given remedy. First, one might 
be tempted to associate the current price of the defendant’s product 
with the static monopoly price. If the current price were equal to the 
static monopoly price, and demand conditions were such that the 
monopoly price were well above cost, then the decline in price 
caused by a horizontal divestiture would certainly be significant. In 
a simple static model, the markup over price charged by a monopo-
list is the inverse of the elasticity of demand. Assuming marginal 
costs greater than zero, if the divestiture created a more competitive 
environment, the price of the product at issue could fall in percent-
age terms by as much as the inverse of the demand elasticity.
79  
With respect to Microsoft, several economists have argued that 
the defendant does not currently price at the monopoly level. One 
study found that if Microsoft priced according to a static monopoly 
model with the kinds of durable entry barriers assumed by the gov-
ernment, the price for Windows would range from nine-hundred to 
sixteen-hundred dollars, well above the retail price of fifty dollars.
80 
Stated differently, how can a firm charging fifty dollars for a product 
be a “monopolist” if a true m onopolist would charge roughly 
twenty to thirty times that amount? The authors of that paper ex-
plain that Microsoft cannot charge the static monopoly price because 
“it faces intense competition from firms that would like their prod-
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/ (1-1/e) and the competitive price is m. The percentage decrease in price is equal to 1/e. A ca-
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80  See Reddy, Evans, and Nichols, Why Does Microsoft Charge So Little for Windows? at 13 
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ucts to displace Windows”
81 and which could enter the market if Mi-
crosoft raised its prices to monopoly levels.  Robert Hall has argued 
that Microsoft needed to keep its prices s ufficiently low so as to 
make self-supply by OEMs “barely unprofitable.”
82 Absent concerns 
about competitive entry, Hall calculates that a monopolist would 
charge over eight hundred dollars per license for Windows.
83 Hence, 
for the purpose of structural analysis, the current price of Windows 
cannot be assumed to equal the monopoly price. If it does not, then 
the price reduction and static welfare gains resulting from divesti-
ture become less certain. 
Second, even if one recognizes that the current price does not 
reflect the monopoly price, it would be incorrect to use the current 
price as the benchmark price from which prices would fall in the 
event of a divestiture. If a behavioral remedy could prevent Micro-
soft from engaging in allegedly anticompetitive conduct that ele-
vated the price of Windows, then it would be incorrect to attribute 
the entire fall in prices uniquely to a structural remedy. Some of the 
price drop would occur from ending the anticompetitive conduct at 
issue, without any further structural change. Incorporating that por-
tion of the fall in price from the current level to the benchmark price 
would overstate the size of the efficiency gain owing specifically to 
the structural remedy. Thus, when estimating the size of the static 
efficiency gain from a structural remedy, the benchmark price 
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not model may be too conjectural to be useful in the real world. See Concord Boat Corp v Bruns-
wick Corp, 207 F3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir 2000) (rejecting under Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
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should be the price that would prevail in the relevant market with 
its existing (that is, pre-divestiture) structure but without anticom-
petitive conduct. The price drop used to calculate the welfare gain 
from the structural remedy would then be the difference between 
that benchmark price and the price predicted under the govern-
ment’s model of competition. 
To summarize, the correct benchmark price from which any ef-
ficiency calculation is performed for structural remedies must ac-
knowledge two important features. First, when predicting the mag-
nitude of a post-remedy price drop, it is incorrect to presume the 
benchmark price to be that of a short-term monopolist with no threat 
of entry. Both entry threats and demand elasticities need to be taken 
into account.
84 Second, a remedy (short of divestiture) that elimi-
nated anticompetitive conduct might itself reduce prices in the rele-
vant market. 
Hence, for the purpose of behavioral analysis, the correct change 
in price would equal the difference between the current price and 
the price that would prevail in the absence of the alleged anticom-
petitive conduct. However, for the purpose of structural analysis, the 
correct change in price would equal the difference between the price 
that would prevail in the absence of the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct and the competitive price (presumably achieved through 
divestiture). 
b)  Calculating the loss in productive efficiency. A remedy should 
preserve as much as possible any operational efficiency achieved by 
a firm’s structure or strategies. Several experts who are studying the 
government’s case against Microsoft have recognized that principle. 
For example, Steven Davis has argued that any proposed remedy 
should allow Microsoft to bundle Internet browsers with other soft-
ware in its Windows operating system because integrating the two 
products has time and cost advantages over separate products.
85  
The consumer benefits from bundling and interoperability can 
be substantial.
86 And when they are, a remedy that prevents bun-
dling b ecause of its perceived effects on competitors would also 
eliminate its benefits for consumers. Courts have thus shied away 
from preventing efficient bundling in the name of competition. A 
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key example from the applicable case law was IBM’s decision to in-
tegrate memory storage and processing capability into a single ma-
chine.
87 IBM’s production decision clearly hurt competing manufac-
turers of peripheral memory storage equipment, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the integra-
tion represented a genuine efficiency and technological advance and 
therefore was not anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. For a 
remedy that barred efficient bundling also to preserve consumer 
welfare, it would have to lower the price of the product at issue 
enough to compensate for the lost benefit from bundling. More gen-
erally, to calculate the productive efficiencies lost as a result of the 
injunctive remedy, the government must present a thorough depic-
tion of the relevant cost curves for the defendant firm. Estimates of 
economies of scale (for a horizontal divestiture) and economies of 
scope (for a vertical divestiture) are required to appreciate the mag-
nitude of the cost savings at risk from a proposed divestiture. 
2.  Step Two: The net gain in static economic efficiency should 
offset any potential losses in dynamic efficiency. 
The idea that dynamic innovation and allocative efficiency 
might differ in their respective responses to market structure was 
suggested over fifty years ago. Joseph A. Schumpeter wrote in 1942 
that, for purposes of economic welfare, “perfect competition is not 
only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as a 
model of ideal efficiency.”
88 With that conjecture, he opened to ques-
tion the very foundation of American antitrust law. The Sherman 
and Clayton Antitrust Acts were premised on the idea that competi-
tion, not economic concentration, would best allocate society’s re-
sources and preserve economic welfare. Schumpeter’s argument that 
most technological innovation would come from large corporations 
with market power and organized R&D operations implied that an-
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note 55). 
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titrust law’s ideal of competition could have substantial social costs 
over time.
89 
Antitrust policy in the United States focuses on market power 
and on how that power will affect prices and output in the relevant 
market. Market share serves as an imperfect but workable proxy for 
market power—the ability to raise prices and restrict output in a 
nontransitory manner—and its centrality in U.S. competition policy 
fits logically with antitrust’s basic premise that economic perform-
ance improves with competition. With a few specific exceptions, 
such as natural monopolies, economic theory and antitrust policy 
have long favored more competition over less for the purposes of 
lowering prices, expanding output, and making consumers better 
off.  
The presumption that increased benefits come from increased 
competition may become less universal, however, when one takes 
into account not only lower prices for a given set of goods produced 
under a fixed set of technologies, but also efficient innovative activ-
ity by firms over time. Theoretical and empirical research has shown 
that, depending on various conditions, either monopoly power or 
competition may increase total innovation.
90 
The debate over the relationship between market structure and 
innovation is an important and difficult one. For current purposes, 
however, the important fact is that such a debate exists, as does con-
sensus that the relationship is likely to depend heavily on firm- and 
industry-specific factors. For that reason, a remedy cannot be as-
sumed to have dynamic benefits, or not to have dynamic costs, sim-
ply because it has static efficiency benefits.  
 It is therefore necessary to ask how, in a specific case, a particu-
lar remedy might affect dynamic innovation. Will a remedy in a mo-
nopolization case eliminate monopoly rent, or merely appropriate 
the legitimate and efficient returns needed to induce risky invest-
ment in the first place? This question has, by analogy, been consid-
ered in the economic theory of utility regulation.
91 “In the absence of 
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90  See, for example, F.M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism, 30 J Econ Literature 
1416, 1421–24 (1992). 
91  See Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 Am Beh 
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a detailed long-term contract,” Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 
observe, “the regulated firm may refrain from investing in the fear 
that once the investment is in place, the regulator would pay only for 
variable cost and would not allow the firm to recoup its sunk cost.”
92 
One can make a similar point with respect to antitrust enforcement 
that misdiagnoses market power or that misclassifies conduct as anti-
competitive.  
Antitrust litigation that seeks to lower the firm’s price and targets 
monopoly rents for eradication will not threaten dynamic efficiency, 
as firms will continue to face efficient incentives to invest. Only the 
inefficient monopoly rent, not the risk-adjusted competitive return 
on investment, will be reduced. But if antitrust litigation appropri-
ates (intentionally or unintentionally) the quasi-rents with which the 
firm would recover its sunk costs in specialized investments, dy-
namic efficiency suffers.
93 It then has an effect similar to the effects of 
contractual opportunism
94 or regulatory holdup.
95 If the decrease in 
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price caused by the antitrust remedy represents an ex post reduction 
of the legitimate return to investment, the defendant firm would not 
have faced a positive expected value ex ante when deciding whether 
to make its original investment. Hence, the defendant firm would 
not have invested in the project that gave rise to the antitrust inter-
vention. Once a case is brought that mistakes legitimate quasi-rents 
for illegally achieved monopoly returns, the precedent will become a 
risk factor that truncates the expected returns to investment—and 
hence incentives to invest—for all firms in the industry. The result is 
a decrease in dynamic efficiency. 
The foregoing principle counsels not only that enforcement 
agencies exercise care in how they categorize conduct or price-cost 
margins, but also that they do not go so far in remedying anticom-
petitive conduct that they also deter beneficial activity. Thus, anti-
trust authorities should bear the burden of demonstrating that the 
price decrease associated with a proposed remedy would not go so 
far as to expropriate legitimate, risk-adjusted returns on investment. 
And, if such remedial precision is not feasible, then the government 
should be able to show that the likely gain in static efficiency ex-
ceeds the present discounted value of any probable loss in dynamic 
efficiency.  
3.  Step Three: Taking enforcement costs into account.  
A complete analysis of the gains from a remedy must take ac-
count of expected enforcement costs. This is not to say that such 
costs cannot be worthwhile. High enforcement costs may be an es-
sential part of a highly beneficial remedy. But if another remedy 
could achieve the same level of benefits at a lesser social cost, then 
the original remedy would fail the Pareto test. The Pareto criterion 
might also not be met if a remedy exists that achieves lower benefits 
but entails lower enforcement costs that compensate for the foregone 
gain. Thus, just as a court or agency should not impose a remedy 
that bars efficient or procompetitive behavior, nor should it ignore a 
remedy’s administrative costs. Indeed, an antitrust remedy “should 
not induce resource misallocation in a manner irreconcilable with 
the very maximization of consumer welfare that animates antitrust 
doctrine.”
96 It can, of course, be difficult to quantify remedial costs. 
They might be quite diffuse, falling on court systems, government 
agencies, private enterprises, and, in the form of resource misalloca-
tion, the general public. In this Section we discuss several factors 
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that may affect the s ocial costs of administering a given antitrust 
remedy. 
The importance of taking enforcement costs into account is 
enormous, though often underemphasized. Consider some of the 
arguments in  Microsoft. Paul Romer submitted testimony on the 
costs and benefits of the government’s proposed divestiture of Mi-
crosoft, yet that testimony contained scant analysis of the transaction 
costs of such a remedy. He conceded that “[t]here is genuine uncer-
tainty about the exact magnitudes of the benefits and any costs” as-
sociated with the government’s proposed remedies, but concluded 
that “any reasonable calculation shows that the expected benefits 
overwhelm the costs.”
97 Similarly, Rebecca Henderson, another of 
the government’s economic witnesses on remedies, asserted that di-
vesting Microsoft’s operating systems business from the company’s 
applications business is the appropriate remedy because “[a] regula-
tory alternative capable of achieving the same ends would necessar-
ily have to be highly intrusive and would almost certainly be signifi-
cantly less effective.”
98  
Absent from each witness’s analysis was rigorous discussion of 
the monitoring and oversight costs of the government’s proposed 
remedy, including the costs associated with strategic litigation over 
interpretation of the government’s proposed final judgment. Given 
the experience of litigation under the AT&T divestiture decree and 
the corresponding provisions that superseded it in the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, which we discuss in greater detail in Part V, 
Romer’s and Henderson’s assessments of the likely costs of the gov-
ernment’s proposed remedy in the Microsoft case, and of how those 
costs compare with the costs of other remedies, is incomplete.  
One can easily imagine, to take only one example, that the 
meaning of “middleware” would be thoroughly litigated by inter-
ested parties, just as the meaning of “information services” was 
thoroughly litigated under the Modification of F inal Judgment 
(“MFJ”).
99 The experience of the AT&T divestiture suggests it may be 
overly sanguine to assume, as Romer does, that legal fees would be 
“one-time costs” that would be “very small compared to the value to 
society of the increased innovation that can reasonably be expected 
to follow from the reorganization” of Microsoft.
100 Similarly, with re-
spect to the conduct provisions of the government’s proposed rem-
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edy, the history of the MFJ teaches that Romer is making a strong as-
sumption in saying that, as long as “Microsoft and the successor 
companies intend to comply with the law, these prohibitions should 
not impose undue costs on their legitimate business activities.”
101 
Pure conduct remedies would clearly involve enforcement costs 
like those mentioned above, so it is unclear why a structural remedy 
that also entails conduct restrictions would not also have such costs. 
Any complete analysis of enforcement costs needs systematically to 
compare the litigation, monitoring, and other administrative costs of 
remedies under consideration. A discussion of some of the factors 
that affect such costs follows. 
a) The connection between the remedy and the anticompetitive act. In 
the law of antitrust damages, it is a fundamental principle, most di-
rectly associated with the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Bruns-
wick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,
102 that damages are available only 
for “antitrust injury,” which is “injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defen-
dants’ acts unlawful.”
103 Writing in 1979, William Baxter predicted that 
Brunswick “will force the federal courts, at least at the damages 
stage, to articulate with precision those respects in which the defen-
dant’s conduct is anticompetitive.”
104 In cases where damages may 
not be sufficient or available, injunctive remedies should embody 
the same principle: they should correspond closely to the behavior 
that produced antitrust liability and be no broader than is necessary 
to rectify the antitrust injury.  
Stated differently, when searching for the optimal remedy, it is 
potentially costly to devise a solution that addresses any actions out-
side the scope of the particular case at hand. A remedy need not ad-
dress any  conduct that either (1) has been alleged, but not estab-
lished, to be anticompetitive or (2) could be anticompetitive but is of 
a kind that has yet to occur. Applying this principle to the govern-
ment’s case against Microsoft, Nicholas Economides has argued that 
the optimal remedy would correct the specific allegations that are 
raised in the government’s case but would have little effect on future 
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behavior of other kinds.
105 Injunctive relief may of course proscribe 
future conduct of the kind that gave rise to antitrust liability in the 
first place. But for the remedy more broadly to bar an action whose 
anticompetitive nature neither has been adjudicated in the particular 
case nor is determinable per se would run a greater risk of reducing 
consumer welfare.  
b) The optimal remedy should minimize administrative costs. Clearly, 
among the set of remedies that achieve the same goal, the preferable 
remedy would be the one that imposes the smallest administrative 
and monitoring costs. For example, even something so apparently 
discrete as auctioning assets or intellectual property rights would 
entail some social costs, such as designing the optimal auction, 
administering the auction, and ensuring that the defendant complies 
with the rules of the auction. While in some cases such costs will be 
trivial in comparison with the remedial gains, in other cases they 
will not and might substantially undermine the remedial goals. 
Indeed, the question of whether an antitrust remedy is practical 
to administer is critical in shaping any remedy. Ideally, a remedy 
should be “self-executing” in the sense that it should not require 
significant oversight or intervention from the courts or a govern-
ment enforcement agency. But as a practical matter, few injunctive 
remedies are truly self-executing, and the effectiveness of most re-
medial solutions will therefore depend in part on how easily they 
can be administered or enforced.  
One factor in administrability will be the number of terms or 
definitions subject to legal dispute. Consider a consent decree ad-
ministered by a court. Judges have limited resources. The more 
complex an injunction, the more motions a judge will have to decide 
concerning the order or decree, and the more information she will 
have to collect and process just to keep up with the markets at issue. 
Masses of conflicting information may be brought forward by par-
ties disputing interpretation of an order, requesting to modify the 
order, or claiming that the order has been violated.  
Another signpost of a decree’s practicability is the extent to 
which it involves the court in the day-to-day administration of a 
business. This measure partly reflects a concern about judicial re-
sources. But it also points to an implicit understanding that courts’ 
expertise lies in answering legal questions, not making business de-
cisions about questions such as pricing, product introduction, and 
investment in risky ventures. The business judgment rule in corpo-
rate law is founded on the same understanding. Delaware corporate 
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law, for example, grants a “presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”
106 Robert Clark has explained that the 
business judgment rule provides “that the business judgment of the 
directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts . . . even for 
judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes.”
107 The same 
concerns over institutional competence that motivate the business 
judgment rule counsel that a court not devise an injunctive remedy 
that it is unlikely to have the expertise and resources to execute. 
This concern that courts by nature are unsuited to entangle 
themselves in running a business arises again today in the debate 
about whether antitrust law has become a system of regulation.
108 Of 
remedies in essential facilities cases, the late Phillip Areeda wrote: 
“No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or 
adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be 
deemed irremedial by antitrust law when compulsory access re-
quires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a 
regulatory agency.”
109 Areeda’s point about preserving the boundary 
between a ntitrust enforcement and industrial regulation applies 
generally to injunctive remedies. The ability of an enjoined firm’s ri-
vals to counter legitimate competitive actions with litigation rather 
than with competitive advances of their own reduces consumer wel-
fare and raises administrative  costs. And any mechanism or re-
quirement for prior approval in the consent decree process destroys 
the element of surprise as a tool of competitive rivalry. A consent 
decree makes a competitive industry resemble a regulated industry 
in which a commission must issue a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity before an allegedly dominant firm may offer a new 
service or enter the market.
110  
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The question of practicality is often whether a given remedy is 
more or less practical than another remedy, not whether it is practi-
cal in an absolute sense. For example, behavioral injunctions are of-
ten considered less practical to administer than structural divesti-
ture. The breakup of AT&T’s telephone monopoly in 1984 arose 
partly because divestiture was viewed as an alternative to increased 
regulation of AT&T and the Regional Bell Operating Companies 
(“RBOCs”). In the course of the decree negotiations, AT&T and the 
Department of Justice considered alternatives that would not have 
split up the Bell System but that would have entailed detailed in-
junctive prescriptions for pricing, interconnection, equipment sales, 
and manufacture. The Department of Justice and perhaps AT&T 
concluded that divestiture would be better than a detailed system of 
behavioral constraints. AT&T asked a top network engineer to con-
sider the impact of some of the Department’s proposed injunctions 
on its network. He concluded: “I think at this point the warning 
must be raised that we may be heading into a massive straightjacket 
that will make the network almost inoperable in the future and 
weigh this against the penalties to the public and to ourselves of 
some degree of divestiture.”
111 The theory of divestiture was to avoid 
such dire outcomes by creating a resolution under which there 
would be no need for injunctions because the activities whose inte-
gration would have been enjoined would now be the province of 
separate firms. Experience ultimately showed that the structural al-
ternative to behavioral injunctions was hardly self-executing. The 
MFJ, the consent decree which governed the pieces of the former 
Bell System after the AT&T divestiture, required the RBOCs to se-
cure the Antitrust Division’s permission whenever they sought to 
enter new markets or offer new services. The district court ulti-
mately received over 900 waiver petitions that required it to rule on 
the meaning and scope of the decree’s theoretically crisp line-of-
business restrictions.
112 There is a good case to be made that Judge 
Greene handled this burden wisely under the circumstances.
113 But 
whether one thinks well or ill of the net effects of the AT&T divesti-
ture—and on this there is hearty debate—it cannot be denied that 
the relief was costly to administer. And the greater the administra-
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tive requirements of a remedy, the greater the risk that antitrust en-
forcement converts into expensive and inefficient industrial policy. 
One further implication of the above discussion is that showing 
one remedy to be more practicable than another does not end the 
analysis. One also should ask whether any remedy is sufficiently 
practicable to yield net benefits, for that question bears on the issue 
of whether an action ought to be brought at all, or whether an exist-
ing case should be terminated.  
c) The remedy should adapt to technological change. The technologi-
cal environment of an industry may have important effects on the 
costs of antitrust enforcement in that industry. On one hand, techno-
logical uncertainty might counsel a conservative approach and mod-
est scope for proposed remedies. On the other hand, Assistant At-
torney General Joel Klein argued that rapid technological innova-
tion, in combination with increasing returns to scale and network ex-
ternalities, means that high technology markets are particularly sus-
ceptible to monopolization.
114 He therefore advocated more vigorous 
antitrust enforcement in such markets.
115 There is little question that 
the risks of enforcement and non-enforcement alike rise in markets 
that change quickly and that are subject to lock-in effects. Where 
both paths are risky, the hard task is to choose the one with the 
greater margin between expected benefits and possible error costs. 
In advocating “a remedy that puts in place a market structure 
conducive to competition and i nnovation” for Microsoft, Carl 
Shapiro has posited that “the goal of enabling, but not compelling, 
competition to Windows in the market for operating systems” 
makes it “important to identify, as best we can, the likely sources of 
such competition in the foreseeable future.”
116 Shapiro asserts that, to 
the extent that those predictions are difficult to make with accuracy, 
such uncertainty strengthens the case for choosing divestiture as a 
remedy: 
One promising entry path into the market for operating sys-
tems is via cross-platform middleware. If such middleware be-
comes widely used, more and more applications may be writ-
ten to that middleware, making it far easier for new operating 
systems to run many popular applications. I do not believe it is 
possible to identify today with any confidence the specific mid-
dleware that will play this role in the next several years. There-
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fore, the remedy chosen by the Court should broadly prevent 
Microsoft from blocking the emergence or widespread distribu-
tion of middleware.
117 
Shapiro emphasizes that “[t]he fact that we cannot confidently pre-
dict today the most significant modes of entry in the future supports 
the structural relief proposed by the plaintiffs.”
118 Similarly, Profes-
sor Daniel Rubinfeld of the University of California, Berkeley (who 
was chief economist of the Antitrust Division during the Microsoft 
case) and Professor Franklin Fisher of MIT have argued that high 
technology industries demand greater antitrust intervention, not 
less.
119 In particular, they argue that because the likelihood for lock-
ing in a large customer base is greater for high technology indus-
tries, antitrust agencies should intervene more aggressively.
120 
The same factors, however, cut in the opposite direction as well: 
Rapid technological change and the need for standards may encour-
age firms in computer markets to grow to a scale that threatens 
competition, but those same forces also create the risk that antitrust 
enforcers may do more harm than good in designing remedies. 
The rapid obsolescence of computer software and hardware 
implies a frequent replacement of the “infrastructure,” which makes 
the software industry far more susceptible to Schumpeterian compe-
tition and entry than the traditionally regulated network industries. 
Therefore, contrary to the prediction that consumers will be com-
pelled by network effects to use overpriced or technically inferior 
products, the PC software industry might contain precisely the con-
ditions for a sequential process of creative destruction. Serious in-
quiry is warranted before one can determine that it serves the inter-
ests of consumers to exclude any firm from, or handicap any firm in, 
such competition for the market.  
d) The remedy should not encourage rent seeking. Some scholars in 
law and economics have questioned whether antitrust law, despite 
its goal of public economic-welfare maximization, truly can avoid 
falling prey to the pursuit of private “rents” by self-serving actors. 
Indeed, there seems no reason to believe that an injunction or con-
sent decree in an antitrust case would be immune from rent-seeking 
behavior by rivals seeking to protect themselves from competition 
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through litigation or other gamesmanship. A remedy i ntended to 
benefit the public could turn into one that benefits private actors at 
the expense of the public.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, legal and economic scholars at the Uni-
versity of Chicago challenged the public interest theory of regula-
tion, which posited that regulation served the interests of consum-
ers.
 121 According to Stigler, Becker, Peltzman, Posner, and other Chi-
cagoans, regulation serves the private interests of regulated firms by 
effecting a form of government-sponsored cartelization. The effect of 
regulation is to create economic rents (supracompetitive returns) 
that could not be earned in the absence of government-imposed re-
strictions on market entry. “Rent seeking behavior” connotes the 
various activities that interest groups undertake to receive such in-
come transfers though the legislative or regulatory process.122 
Antitrust is not immune to certain kinds of rent seeking behav-
ior.
123 If a remedy creates opportunities for competitors or others to 
seek private gain at public expense through litigation and related ac-
tivities, the transaction costs of administering the remedy and the 
costs of erroneous decisions in enforcing the remedy could dissipate 
the expected value of the relief granted. 
In summary, a consumer welfare test for antitrust remedies re-
quires analysis of more than just static efficiency and the behavior of 
short-run market prices. Rather, before a court or e nforcement 
agency can conclude that a remedy is efficient, a case must be made 
that expected price reductions will offset any production cost i n-
creases or losses in consumer-side network externalities; that the net 
gain from such price reductions will not entail offsetting costs in the 
form of inefficiently reduced innovation incentives; and that the re-
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maining net gains can then not be achieved at a lower cost through 
an alternative remedial plan. 
B.  Reconciling the Economic Welfare Test with Existing Law 
The corpus of antitrust law is surprisingly unhelpful in articu-
lating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for issuing an 
injunctive remedy, whether the injunction is formally styled as a 
court order or as a consent decree. The Sherman Act empowers the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to 
seek injunctive relief for antitrust violations. The Clayton Act simi-
larly authorizes the government, as well as private parties, to seek 
injunctive relief. The judicial authority to issue injunctions and the 
executive authority to enter into consent decrees give courts, the De-
partment, and the FTC broad flexibility in designing remedies such 
as divestitures, rescissions, spin-offs,
124 compulsory licensing of intel-
lectual property,
125 recordkeeping and reporting, price regulation, 
and so on. Even if the tradition of equity did not empower antitrust 
authorities to request, and courts to order, a broad range of reme-
dies, the role that consent decrees play in antitrust litigation offers 
them a similarly wide breadth of options. Because of the prevalence 
of consent decrees, we will begin by analyzing principles from the 
applicable law on decrees. We will then briefly examine the princi-
ples found in other antitrust case law. 
1.  Limited lessons from Tunney Act jurisprudence.  
Most antitrust suits are resolved by a consent decree, an agree-
ment negotiated between the Department of Justice and the antitrust 
defendant.
126 A consent decree is an agreement between the parties 
entered as an order of the court.
127 As a negotiated agreement, some 
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courts see the consent decree more as a contract, while others liken it 
more to a judicial order.
128 The Supreme Court explained in United 
States v Armour & Co
129 that in a consent decree the parties 
waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and 
thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of 
litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies 
a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimina-
tion of risk, the parties each give up something they might have 
won had they proceeded with the litigation.
130 
Moreover, because the consent decree is not an admission of liabil-
ity, it does not serve as prima facie evidence of liability in later anti-
trust suits against the defendant by private parties or others.
131 In 
practical effect, the Department of Justice or the FTC can obtain in a 
consent decree anything to which the parties will agree, including 
divestiture, compulsory licensing, or other concessions. 
a) Criteria for approval of an antitrust consent decree. The Antitrust 
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, better known as the Tunney 
Act,
132 establishes substantive and procedural standards for the ap-
proval of a consent decree and thus provides the administrative un-
derpinnings for the resolution of most actual cases. Congress passed 
the Tunney Act in response to concerns that the Department of Jus-
tice had negotiated several consent decrees in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s without adequate public or judicial scrutiny.
133 The stat-
ute therefore establishes procedures to ensure public comment on 
                                                                                                                                                      
the parties agree to terminate a lawsuit. In a “consent decree,” the parties agree to termi-
nate a lawsuit and the court enters the agreement as an order of the court. One difference . 
. . is that if a party breaches an ordinary settlement agreement, the other party must file a 
new lawsuit to enforce their private settlement contract; by contrast, if a party breaches a 
consent decree, then that contract can be enforced as a continuation of the original law-
suit, and the breaching party can be held in contempt. A second difference . . . is that 
third parties cannot be bound unless the court is involved; that is, a consent decree must 
be used. 
Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 
J Legal Stud 55, 58 n 13 (1999)(eio). 
128  See Lorain NAACP v Lorain Board of Education, 979 F2d 1141, 1148 (6th Cir 1992) (noting 
that a consent decree was declared by one court to be “a voluntary settlement agreement 
which could be fully effective without judicial intervention” and by another court to be “a fi-
nal judicial order . . . plac[ing] the power and prestige of the court behind the compromise 
struck by the parties”) (quotations omitted). See also Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its 
Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 
72 NYU L Rev 625, 630 (1997).  
129  402 US 673 (1971). 
130  Id at 681. 
131  See Clayton Act, 15 USC § 16(a) (1994) (exempting consent decrees from rule that final 
judgments are prima facie evidence of liability for purposes of collateral estoppel). 
132  Pub L No 93-528, 88 Stat 1706 (1974), codified as amended at 15 USC § 16(b)–(h) (1994). 
133  See id.  2000]  Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries  137 
proposed decrees and to minimize secrecy.
134 It also requires courts 
to scrutinize decrees to ensure that they are “in the public interest” 
before entering them as orders of the court.
135 But the view that the 
Tunney Act was needed to prevent a widespread practice among 
judges of rubberstamping consent decrees is exaggerated. Long be-
fore the Tunney Act was passed, the Supreme Court had repeatedly 
held that a consent decree was a court order as well as a contract,
136 
and some review of the decree was necessary under general equita-
ble principles. The Court emphasized that considerable deference 
was owed to the Attorney General’s discretion, and later courts fol-
lowed in this tradition.
137 But courts sometimes asked for modifica-
tions of proposed decrees to protect the rights of third parties, or 
they examined whether the decree was consistent with the com-
plaint.
138 Congress intended the Tunney Act to continue this scru-
tiny, not to alter it radically.
139  
The Tunney Act’s public interest standard has remained amor-
phous.
140 It more closely resembles a laundry list of factors than a 
test.
141 Thus, the Act itself does not provide particular guidance as to 
which remedy a court should prefer. Rather, it establishes proce-
dures to prevent the appearance of a decree’s being corrupted by 
politics or collusion. And its public interest standard affirms that 
courts, as well as the Department of Justice, have some role in using 
substantive analysis, as described below, to shape an antitrust rem-
edy.  
There are ultimately limits to this judicial discretion. Early in 
1995, Judge Stanley Sporkin, presiding over an earlier suit by the 
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Department of Justice against Microsoft, refused to approve the con-
sent decree
142 proposed in that case.
143 Under the consent decree, Mi-
crosoft promised not to use per-processor licenses.
144  
The decree moreover barred Microsoft from conditioning the li-
censing of one covered product on the purchase of another.
145 Judge 
Sporkin’s concern was that the court did not have enough informa-
tion to assess the decree, and that the decree, as well as the Depart-
ment of Justice’s complaint, failed to address alleged anticompetitive 
practices by Microsoft, such as the promotion of “vaporware.”
146 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, held that the 
lower court had overreached its authority and reassigned the case to 
another judge on remand.
147 The court held that the Tunney Act does 
not give a judge the power to review practices that are outside the 
scope of the complaint
148 and that a judge may reject a consent de-
cree only if it “make[s] a mockery of judicial power.”
149 Few strong 
principles are likely to emerge from such a framework of review. 
b) General principles for modifying or vacating a consent decree. An-
other source of potential guidance is jurisprudence on altering con-
sent decrees. The court with which a consent decree is entered gen-
erally retains the right to modify or vacate the decree. Writing for 
the Supreme Court in United States v Swift & Co
150 in 1932, Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo acknowledged “the power of a court of equity to 
modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it 
was entered by consent.”
151 Similarly, Judge Henry Friendly wrote 
for the Second Circuit in 1983 that “[t]he power of a court of equity 
to modify a decree of injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and 
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150  286 US 106 (1932). 
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flexible.”
152 The standards for modifying or vacating antitrust con-
sent decrees remain linked to the more general jurisprudence of con-
sent decrees and injunctive remedies. Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment may be vacated 
or modified if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application.”
153  
In Swift, decided before the adoption of Rule 60(b)(5), the Su-
preme Court reversed a modification of a consent decree entered 
against major meat packers for anticompetitive behavior.
154 Noting 
that the meat packers “are not suffering hardship so extreme and 
unexpected as to justify us in saying they are the victims of oppres-
sion,”
155 the Court held that “[n]othing less than a clear showing of 
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions”
156 was 
necessary to warrant the alteration of a consent decree. The “griev-
ous wrong” standard was widely adopted as the general approach 
to modifying consent decrees.
157  
In United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp,
158 the Court held 
that the Swift standard did not apply where the government is the 
party who seeks to modify the terms of the decree to accomplish its 
purposes.
159 In United Shoe Machinery, the government had sought to 
have the consent decree governing United Shoe modified so as to 
require the company to be split into two competing businesses.
160 
The district court refused to modify the decree, relying on Swift.
161 In 
reversing, the Court distinguished the government’s proposed 
modification of the decree from Swift, where the defendants against 
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crees also applies to antitrust consent decrees. United States v Western Electric Co, Inc, 46 F3d 
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(D DC 1999) [SNC].  
154  See 286 US at 118–20. Justice Cardozo’s opinion was joined by only three justices. Jus-
tices Butler and Van Devanter dissented. Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Sutherland, and Justice 
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155  Id at 119. 
156  Id.  
157  See, for example, Roberts v St. Regis Paper Co, 653 F2d 166, 174 (5th Cir 1981); De Filippis 
v United States, 567 F2d 341, 344 (7th Cir 1977); Humble Oil & Refining Co v American Oil Co, 405 
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1105, 1109 (6th Cir 1989); Plyler v Evatt, 846 F2d 208, 211–12 (4th Cir 1988); Carey, 706 F2d at 
970. 
158  391 US 244 (1968) 
159  See id at 248–49. 
160  See id at 247.  
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whom the decree was entered were seeking to “escape [the] impact” 
of the decree.
162  
In Rufo v Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
163 the Supreme Court held 
in 1992 that the Swift standard was not codified by Rule 60(b)(5).
164 
Stating that the “grievous wrong” language of Swift “was not in-
tended to take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all ef-
forts to modify consent decrees,” the Court adopted “a less strin-
gent, more flexible standard.”
165 Under Rufo, a consent decree may 
be modified “when changed factual conditions make compliance 
with the decree substantially more onerous[,] . . . when a decree 
proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles[,] . . . or 
when enforcement of the decree without modification would be det-
rimental to the public interest.”
166 The party seeking the modification 
bears the burden of establishing these conditions.
167 The Court re-
fused to require that the change in factual conditions be “unforeseen 
or unforeseeable.”
168 However, where a change in facts or conditions 
was anticipated, “[a] party would have to satisfy a heavy burden” in 
asking a court to modify the decree.
169  
Rufo involved institutional reform—a consent decree requiring 
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, to construct a new jail. Since Rufo, 
the lower courts have split on the application of Rufo outside the 
context of institutional reform litigation. Some circuits have held that 
Rufo applies regardless of the context.
170 Others have limited Rufo to 
the institutional reform setting.
171 Still other courts have found that 
neither Swift’s grievous-wrong standard nor Rufo’s more flexible ap-
proach applies in every case.
172 Despite this difference of opinion 
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163  502 US 367 (1992). 
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165  Id at 380. 
166  Id at 384. 
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168  Id at 385. 
169  Id.  
170  See Bellevue Manor Associates v United States, 165 F3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir 1999); Western 
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171  See Epp v Kerrey, 964 F2d 754, 756 (8th Cir 1992) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recently 
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W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc v C.R. Bard, Inc, 977 F2d 558, 562 (Fed Cir 1992); Lorain NAACP, 979 
F2d at 1149. 
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among the circuits, there is little doubt that Rufo applies to antitrust 
decrees, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1995 
found Rufo applicable to a motion to modify the antitrust decree that 
effected the AT&T divestiture.
173  
2.  Lessons from Sherman Act jurisprudence on the optimal 
design of antitrust remedies. 
The jurisprudence of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts 
does not enunciate grand principles for the design of optimal reme-
dies. One can observe recurrent themes, but they must be teased out 
of the disparate cases. In this Section, we identify and discuss those 
themes.  
The long debate about whether the Sherman Act is intended to 
protect consumer welfare and to advance economic efficiency or to 
serve more populist goals is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
But in brief, we note that the view that consumer welfare should be a 
paramount goal of the Act is supported by two main arguments. 
First, the language of the Act itself refers to monopoly and competi-
tion, primarily economic concepts, and not to the more populist idea 
that the antitrust laws are intended to stop any commercial power 
from b ecoming “too big.” Second, while some legislators may not 
have realized this, it is not always possible for the antitrust laws to 
serve both consumer welfare and the goal of breaking up anything 
“too big”—these goals may well contradict each other.  
Alternative theoretical bases for antitrust law cannot justify 
adopting remedies that cause a net harm to consumers. This princi-
ple is at the heart of Baxter’s axiom. In choosing a behavioral or 
structural remedy, courts must avoid remedies that would harm the 
public and remain alert to the unintended consequences of a rem-
edy, both at the time a decree is entered and as the decree is imple-
mented over time.  
a) Conditions for adopting injunctive remedies. One threshold prin-
ciple that emerges from Anglo-American traditions of law and eq-
uity is that injunctions are available when damages are an insuffi-
cient remedy.
174 Thus, injunctive remedies should not be considered 
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173  See Western Electric, 46 F3d at 1203.  
174  See, for example, Beacon Theatres, Inc v Westover, 359 US 500, 506–07 (1959) (“The basis 
for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of 
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unless damages are either insufficient to address the harm or un-
available for legal or practical reasons. The initial presumption in the 
remedies phase, in other words, should be that economic harm is 
compensable through payment of monetary damages. From an eco-
nomic perspective, damages that are correctly calculated will force 
the defendant to internalize the social cost of his harmful behavior 
and thus desist from continuing it.
175 And, of course, the payment of 
damages is administratively tidier, for both courts and litigants, than 
the continued oversight and interpretation of an injunctive remedy. 
In addition, a damage remedy runs less of a risk than an injunction 
does of mistakenly curtailing activities or preventing firm structures 
that achieve operational efficiencies. It bears emphasis that Microsoft 
is subject to (1) a remedy from the district court; (2) private lawsuits 
(including potential ones that might be brought by Netscape, OEMs, 
and Sun); and (3) indirect purchaser cases in multiple jurisdictions. 
Thus, if Microsoft ultimately loses in the government’s case, it will 
face Judge Jackson’s remedy (including any potential modifications 
by appellate courts), plus treble damages in the direct purchaser 
cases, plus treble damages in the indirect purchaser cases. 
Identifying when a damage remedy is sufficient, and therefore 
preclusive of injunctive relief, can be difficult in some cases. As 
Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff have noted, the economic theory 
of damages “starts from the proposition that the purpose of dam-
ages is to deter inefficient activity but not to be so burdensome as to 
deter efficient activity.”
176 Hence, an optimal damage award is one 
that balances the costs and benefits of deterrence. Calculation of the 
optimal damage award thus requires an appreciation of the ex ante 
payoff calculations of the firm. A profit-maximizing firm has an in-
centive to violate antitrust laws if the expected punishment is less 
than the expected gain.
177 If the probability of detection is less than 
one, an ex post damage award equal to the actual damages incurred 
may not discourage that activity in the future. This is part of the rea-
son the federal antitrust laws allow an injured party to recover treble 
damages.
178 Given this background, necessary conditions for the exe-
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cution of a damage remedy are (1) a proper estimation of damages 
that were incurred because of the anticompetitive behavior and (2) a 
proper estimation of the probability of detection and prosecution at 
the time the anticompetitive behavior was performed. Where such 
calculations cannot reasonably be made, injunctive relief should be 
considered. 
Injunctive relief also comes into play where damages are not 
available as a remedy. Unlike states that have the power to request 
monetary damages on behalf of their citizens, the Department of Jus-
tice can only sue for actual damages that the U.S. government has it-
self incurred.
179 In addition, the Department of Justice can sue for 
monetary fines up to ten million dollars.
180 But where such fines nei-
ther compensate for nor adequately deter the harm done, injunctions 
need to be considered. 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes “any person who shall 
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws” to sue for treble damages.
181 A “person” 
for this purpose generally i ncludes private persons and corpora-
tions, but it includes the U.S. government only when the govern-
ment sues under Section 4A in its capacity as a consumer of goods 
(for example, in a suit against a federal contractor).
182 Under Section 
4C of the Clayton Act, the attorney general of a state may bring a 
parens patriae civil suit to recover damages for natural persons re-
siding in the state.
183 Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes private 
plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief, including divestiture.
184 Permanent 
or temporary injunctive relief may not be obtained, however, if the 
private plaintiff has an adequate damage remedy.
185 The question of 
the sufficiency of a damage remedy (or, alternately, the necessity of 
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179  Clayton Act, 15 USC § 15(a), (c) (1994). 
180  See 15 USC § 2 (1994).  
181  15 USC § 15(a). 
182  See United States v Cooper Corp, 312 US 600 (1941) (holding that the United States is 
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Standard Oil Co of California, 405 US 251 (1972) (holding that a state could not claim damages on 
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of commodities). 
183  See 15 USC § 15(c). 
184  See 15 USC § 26 (1994 & Supp 1998). 
185  See, for example, Oakland Tribune, Inc v Chronicle Publishing Co, Inc, 762 F2d 1374 (9th 
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injunctive relief) therefore generally arises when a private plaintiff 
seeks injunctive relief in addition, or as an alternative, to damages.
186 
A damage remedy is used to address monetary harms suffered 
by the antitrust defendant’s competitors and customers. Higher 
costs of doing business are generally compensable by money dam-
ages. For example, a shoe manufacturer that paid more to lease shoe 
machines when it was prevented by antitrust violations from buying 
them from the defendant was entitled to recover the difference in 
cost from the defendant shoe machinery manufacturer.
187 In cases of 
price fixing or tying, the difference between the defendant’s price 
and the market price paid by a consumer of the good is redressed by 
monetary damages.
188 Profits lost when a monopolist drives a com-
petitor out of business are recoverable by money damages,
189 and the 
measure of damages includes lost future profits.
190 Loss of the busi-
ness’s value as a going concern is also compensable by monetary 
damages as an alternative to future profits.
191 
By contrast, injunctive relief is available in a narrower range of 
situations. Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that injunctive re-
lief shall be granted “[w]hen and under the same conditions and 
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will 
cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity.”
192 The statute 
does not expressly call for an inquiry into the adequacy of damages, 
but the tradition of equity plainly supplies it. In that tradition, an in-
junction may be obtained only when irreparable harm is threatened 
without it.
193 Damages are generally considered adequate when the 
harm is purely monetary, the figure is calculable, and the defendant 
can pay. Examples of harms that are adequately redressed by mone-
tary damages include the failure to place advertisements for a busi-
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ness in the Yellow Pages
194 and a newspaper’s lost circulation reve-
nues.
195 
Thus, an injunctive remedy is available when anticompetitive 
conduct threatens to drive a business from the market. When the ex-
istence of a plaintiff’s business is threatened, the court is likely to 
presume that an irreparable harm is threatened, without undertak-
ing an elaborate inquiry into whether such harm in some way could 
be compensated by money damages.
196 Sometimes, threatened loss of 
market share, customers, or goodwill will entitle a plaintiff to an in-
junction.
197 An impending loss of corporate control that threatens to 
reveal confidential information may also persuade the court to grant 
an injunction.
198 Injunctions are commonly available to stop an anti-
competitive merger or acquisition from going forward. 
Courts have found a threat of irreparable harm when the anti-
trust defendant threatens to repeat its behavior. In Zenith Radio Corp 
v Hazeltine Research, Inc,
199 the Supreme Court upheld an injunction 
against Hazeltine, a corporation that licensed U.S. patents in radio 
and television technology and which had participated in several 
patent pools, the most troublesome one being in Canada.
200 Zenith, a 
would-be competitor, had been awarded money damages suffered 
when it was excluded from the Canadian market over a four-year 
period. Given evidence that the Canadian pool would not retreat, 
the Court upheld an injunction against Hazeltine that would prevent 
it from asserting its claims through the Canadian pool. Writing for 
the majority, Justice White noted: “Neither the relative quiescence of 
the pool during the litigation nor claims that objectionable conduct 
would cease with the judgment negated the threat to Zenith’s for-
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eign trade. That threat was too clear for argument, and injunctive re-
lief . . . was wholly proper.”
201 By contrast, when an antitrust defen-
dant can convince the court that its behavior will not be repeated, 
money damages for past conduct are adequate.
202  
The Court in Zenith Radio did not expressly ask whether money 
damages would be inadequate if and when the conduct was re-
peated. Some later courts found it enough that money damages 
would not be adequate at the time of the suits then before them. 
Money damages could be obtained only after the harm was sus-
tained and its amount could be proven. Therefore money damages 
are viewed as inadequate whenever there is a nonspeculative threat 
of future harm. In a case enjoining a producer of gasoline from ter-
minating or refusing to renew distributors’ leases in retaliation for 
the antitrust suit, one court stated, “A future injury of uncertain date 
and incalculable magnitude is irreparable harm, and protection from 
such an injury is a legitimate end of injunctive relief.”
203 But at least 
one court has concluded that damages for future lost profits ade-
quately compensate a plaintiff company against the future danger, 
and that a plaintiff can have either an injunction or future damages, 
but not both.
204  
Symmetry thus exists between the sufficient conditions for 
damages and the necessary conditions for injunctive relief. Damages 
are deemed sufficient under the law when (1) the harm is purely 
monetary, (2) the figure is calculable, and (3) the defendant does not 
threaten to repeat its behavior. Injunctive relief is necessary when 
the harm to a competitor i s irreparable. Conveniently, the courts 
have defined irreparable harm to mean (1) the harm would entail the 
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loss of a competitor’s business, (2) the figure is incalculable, and (3) 
there is a nonspeculative threat of future harm. 
With respect to the government’s antitrust case against Micro-
soft, the application of the above analysis would proceed as follows 
if damages were available: First, did Microsoft’s competitors incur 
harm b eyond purely monetary damages, such as loss of business, 
due to Microsoft’s anticompetitive behavior? Second, if not, are the 
damages that were incurred calculable? Stated differently, is there 
an economic model that can be used to estimate the amount of the 
damages incurred by consumers or competitors? Third, conditional 
upon a properly calibrated damage figure that was paid by Micro-
soft—that is, a figure that accounted for the likelihood of detection 
and prosecution—is there a nonspeculative threat of future harm 
that could not be curbed by the threat of similar damages?  
b) Choosing among injunctive remedies. The Clayton Act and the 
Sherman Act give the federal courts jurisdiction to use injunctive 
remedies to prevent and restrain antitrust violations.
205 In cases 
brought by the Department of Justice, the alternatives b efore the 
court at the remedies stage are either behavioral (conduct) remedies, 
or structural remedies. Behavioral remedies include orders prevent-
ing a business from acquiring new businesses of a certain type, re-
fraining from offering certain goods or services, requiring a com-
pany to sell to all buyers on the same terms (nondiscrimination) or 
on regulated terms, to modify or cancel the defendant’s existing con-
tracts.
206 The principal structural remedies are divestiture and 
dissolution.  
i)  Behavioral versus structural remedies. In choosing 
among behavioral and structural remedies, courts enjoy wide discre-
tion. It is important to note that any structural remedy contains im-
plicit behavioral r estrictions. For example, a divestiture of Micro-
soft’s Internet browser software would implicitly require that Micro-
soft refrain from giving preferential treatment to the spin-off over 
other Internet browser providers. Structural remedies may carry 
with them all or many of the administrative costs necessary to en-
force purely behavioral restrictions. Thus, when considering struc-
tural and behavioral remedies, one cannot presume that the long-
term administrative costs will be lower for the former than for the 
latter.  
If a behavioral remedy more modest than divestiture would ef-
fectively remove the danger to existing competition, it may be suffi-
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cient even when taking enforcement costs into account.
207 In United 
Shoe Machinery Corp v United States,
208 for example, the 1953 trial 
court chose three simple behavioral constraints instead of divesti-
ture. The first required United to sell every machine it leased; the 
second required nondiscriminatory lease terms, with repair unbun-
dled from rates for use; and the third required compulsory licensing 
of patents on a reasonable royalty basis. In rejecting more restrictive 
provisions, the court noted that “it would be undesirable, at least 
until milder remedies have been tried,” to bar United Shoe from 
leasing its machines altogether.
209  
Structural remedies intended to alter incentives are more likely 
to be used when the court perceives a monopolist as being particu-
larly durable or likely to repeat his anticompetitive conduct. Intent is 
one indication of this. In affirming the dissolution of the Standard 
Oil combination, the Supreme Court found  that  the evidence 
showed Standard Oil’s intent to eliminate competitors to be “so cer-
tain as practically to cause the subject not to be within the domain of 
reasonable contention.”
210  
Another indicator of durability is the fact that other remedies 
have been tried before and failed, generally over a period of dec-
ades. Divestiture of single-firm monopolists in the twentieth century 
was rarely, if ever, attempted without alternatives having first been 
exhausted. For example, the Department of Justice had pursued 
United Shoe Machinery since 1912,
211 but did not satisfy the courts 
that divestiture was required until 1969.
212  
Extra caution is due where a single firm with unified manage-
ment and product development is being divested. The theatres di-
vested in United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc,
213 for example, could 
be segregated into separate enterprises without unduly affecting the 
management of the producer’s core business. Standard Oil was 
really a combination, not a single firm. United Shoe divested a single 
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211  United Shoe Machinery, 110 F Supp at 298. 
212  See United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 1969 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 72,688 at 
86,445–46 (ordering divestiture).  
213  See 66 F Supp 323 (S D NY 1946), affd in part and revd in part, US v Paramount Pic-
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firm with unified management, but the shoe machinery industry 
was not especially “convergent” or networked: there were no dy-
namic pushing machines to be integrated with shoe manufacture. As 
AT&T operates in a fast-moving industry offering consumers the 
benefit of network effects, its divestiture is probably most analogous 
to Microsoft’s. But the divestiture of AT&T quickly became a long-
running administrative obligation for the court and the parties sub-
ject to the decree.  
Indeed, the cases mentioned above show that practicability has 
traditionally been a significant factor in deciding to elect a conduct 
or a structural remedy. This issue is related to the level of intrusive-
ness into the day-to-day operation of the business that the remedy 
would require of the court or other antitrust enforcer. This partly re-
flects the concern that it would take too much time for the court to 
do this. But it also points to an implicit understanding that courts’ 
expertise lies in answering legal questions, not making business de-
cisions about questions such as pricing.  
For example, in considering a proposed remedy in the antitrust 
suit against the major motion picture studios, later resulting in the 
Paramount decrees, the lower court proposed to allow the exhibitors 
of movies to obtain them through competitive bidding, rejecting di-
vestiture.
214 Reversing, the Supreme Court offered as one reason for 
rejecting competitive bidding that it would not do anything to de-
crease the studios’ market power; vertically integrated thea-
ter/studios would still be guaranteed access to their own pictures 
and thus have an advantage over independents.
215 The Court also 
explained that the “highest bid” for a picture could not be deter-
mined simply by comparing the money amount offered for the pic-
ture—one would also have to consider non-monetary considera-
tions, such as the size and l ocation of a theatre, whether rental 
would be paid by a share of gross receipts, or other terms. The Court 
protested that the decree “involves the judiciary so deeply in the 
daily operation of this nationwide business and promises such dubi-
ous benefits that it should not be undertaken.”
216 On remand, the 
lower court opted for divestiture instead.
217  
                                                                                                                                                      
214  See 66 F Supp at 323; United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc, 70 F Supp 53 (S D NY 
1947), affd in part and revd in part, 334 US 131 (1948), remanded, 85 F Supp 881 (S D NY 1949), 
affd, 339 US 984 (1950). For an economic analysis of the case, see Arthur De Vany and Ross D. 
Eckert, Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount Cases Revisited, 14 Research in L & Econ 51 
(1991).  
215  See Paramount, 334 US at 162–63. 
216  Id at 162. 
217  See United States v Paramount Pictures, Inc, 85 F Supp 881 (S D NY 1949), affd, 339 US 
984 (1950).  150  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
Some have argued that, as a general rule, divestiture remedies 
are actually less disruptive, intrusive, and costly to administer than 
conduct remedies.
218 This was reportedly the reason that AT&T 
opted for divestiture in 1984. Note, however, that the administrative 
realities of the AT&T case refute the proposition that structural 
remedies are necessarily more practicable than conduct remedies. As 
we will discuss more extensively in Part V, courts were continually 
faced with monitoring the behavior of the units into which AT&T 
was broken up.  
Indeed, the AT&T case illustrates the fact that ambitious struc-
tural remedies that incorporate supervisory and behavioral elements 
might require as much, or even more, continued judicial scrutiny as 
behavioral remedies require. AT&T may not have felt the brunt of 
the implicit behavioral requirements, but the Bell Companies split 
off from AT&T certainly did, as many injunctions were deployed to 
maintain the segregation between markets created by the decree.  
The MFJ provided a waiver process by which the RBOCs could 
request the court’s permission to enter new markets. Under Section 
VIII(C) of the decree, the RBOCs were entitled to have a particular 
line-of-business restriction lifted if they could show that “there [was] 
no substantial possibility” that a BOC could use its monopoly power 
to impede competition in the market that it proposed to enter.
219 But 
the waiver process worked much less smoothly in practice than it 
had been expected to in theory. In 1993, the average waiver request 
had been pending for thirty-six months even though the Department 
of Justice opposed relief in only four of the 266 requests.
220 By 1994, 
the backlog period had grown to 54.7 months, although the court 
approved 96 percent of the waiver requests had ruled.
221 By that 
point, the ostensibly straightforward consent decree had become a 
new layer of regulation for the telecommunications industry.
222  
                                                                                                                                                      
218  See, for example, Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and 
Its Origins 100 (West 1994) (divestiture is a “relatively easy” remedy to implement when “the 
defendant has been composed of several formerly separate firms and has retained multiple 
production facilities”).  
219  United States v American Telephone  and Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 231 (D DC 1982) 
(Modification of Final Judgment § VIII(C)).  
220  See Paul H. Rubin and Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking Under the 
Modification of Final Judgment, 16 Managerial & Decision Econ 385, 385–87 (1995), cited in Jerry 
A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks, 109 Yale L J 417, 428 (1999).  
221   See id at 387–89. 
222  See Sidak and Spulber, Deregulatory Takings at 56 (cited in note 58); Temin and Weber, 
8 U Fla J L & Pub Pol at 209–10 (cited in note 111); Paul W. MacAvoy, The Failure of Antitrust 
and Regulation to Establish Competition in Long-Distance Telephone Services (MIT & AEI 1996); 
Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 
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Concern about unforeseen implementation costs and economic 
consequences was a significant reason the trial court refused in 1953 
to divest United Shoe; the government had apparently not given di-
vestiture much thought until the remedies phase of the trial arrived. 
The court found the plan to break the single firm up into three “un-
realistic,” given that United Shoe’s operations were all centered in a 
single plant and used common tools, a common lab, and a common 
managerial force.
223 The court noted that: 
A petition for dissolution should reflect greater attention to 
practical problems and should involve supporting economic 
data and prophesies such as are presented in corporate reor-
ganization and public utility dissolution cases. Moreover, the 
petition should involve a more formal commitment by the At-
torney General, than is involved in the divergent proposals that 
his assistants have made in briefs and in oral arguments ad-
dressed to the Court.
224 
The case can thus be read for the proposition that any far-reaching 
relief proposal must at least take thorough and coherent account of 
practical details and their possible consequences. 
ii)  Divestiture versus compulsory licensing. A quasi-
structural, and more common, alternative to divestiture is the com-
pulsory licensing of copyrights or patents for a reasonable fee.
225 A 
patent or copyright owner subject to compulsory licensing must li-
cense the intellectual property to all comers, losing his right of re-
fusal. In deciding whether to order compulsory licensing with a fee, 
or the harsher remedy of royalty-free l icensing, one commentator 
reports that “[m]ost courts stress current economic considerations 
when deciding whether to order compulsory licensing; . . . the em-
phasis of many other courts which have favored dedication or roy-
alty-free licensing has been on past conduct instead.”
226 When com-
pulsory licensing for a fee is ordered, it will usually be for the practi-
                                                                                                                                                      
223  United Shoe Machinery, 110 F Supp at 348. 
224  Id. 
225  See, for example, United States v Glaxo Group Ltd, 410 US 52, 60–64 (1973); United States 
v National Lead Co, 332 US 319, 348 (1947); United States v United Techs Corp, 1980-1 Trade Cases 
(CCH) ¶ 63,792 (N D NY 1981) (partial divestiture); International Tel & Tel Corp v General Tel & 
Elec Corp, 351 F Supp 1153 (D Hawaii 1973) (judgment, not consent decree), affd in part and 
revd in part, 518 F2d 913 (9th Cir 1975). As of 1980, compulsory licensing had been used as a 
remedy in more than 125 cases. See also Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality 
of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 Cal L Rev 1599, 1608 n 63 (1990). 
226  Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy for Patent 
Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 467, 513 
(1998). 152  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
cal reason that the intellectual property involved is the source of the 
perceived anticompetitive effect.
227 
In choosing between a compulsory licensing remedy and dives-
titure, courts will consider whether the anticompetitive conduct at 
issue closely involves the patent or copyright. If so, a remedy that 
focuses on the licenses might be more effective than a divestiture of 
assets.
228 William Kovacic reports that economists have not generally 
found compulsory licensing remedies effective in deconcentrating 
markets;
229 on the other hand, he finds as much or more criticism of 
divestiture remedies.
230  
The case law on remedies does not, in the end, provide a set of 
axioms that can be applied systematically to the choice among anti-
trust remedies. It does, however, provide broad guidance on several 
points. Notably, it suggests that less intrusive remedies like damages 
should be considered first, and that more stringent relief like divesti-
ture must not be entered into blindly or without careful considera-
tion of possible practical consequences. To the extent that the appli-
cable precedent bears on the question at all, it is consistent with the 
economic welfare approach we have described. We next apply our 
framework for evaluating antitrust remedies to the particular case of 
Microsoft.  
III.  THE THEORY AND FINDINGS OF MICROSOFT  
On May 18, 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice and, separately, 
a group of twenty states and the District of Columbia (which we col-
lectively call “the states”) filed civil lawsuits against Microsoft as-
serting violations of federal antitrust laws and, in the states’ actions, 
                                                                                                                                                      
227  When a reasonable fee is ordered, the court must set the rate to be paid for the license 
on the theory that if it does not the “compulsory” nature of the license would be meaningless. 
The results of these judicial ventures into rate-making are as problematic as other regulatory 
exercises in price setting, and are not generally considered successful. One proposal to solve 
the pricing problem with the compulsory license is to auction the license to the highest bidder. 
This will yield a market price. This type of auction would produce only one licensee, the high-
est bidder. The auction can also be modified to yield a number of licensees. One might, for ex-
ample, select a number of licensees in advance, take a number of bids equal to the number of 
licensees, and require each licensee to pay the highest bid. 
228  See United States v Spectra-Physics, Inc, 1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 64,290, 1981 US 
Dist LEXIS 15030 (N D Cal) (holding that consent decree required compulsory licensing for a 
fee rather than divestiture when merger of two companies lessened competition in the devel-
opment of certain laser-based products). 
229  See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the 
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L Rev 1105, 1106–07 n 9 (1989) (“Most com-
mentators have concluded that compulsory licensing decrees generally have contributed little 
to the accomplishment of deconcentration objectives.”), citing F. M. Scherer, Innovation and 
Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives 207, 220 (MIT 1984). But see Kovacic, 74 Iowa L Rev at 1111 
n 30 (linking compulsory licensing of Xerox patent to greater innovation). 
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additional violations of the states’ respective antitrust laws.
231 The 
complaints were the culmination of an extensive investigation jointly 
pursued by the Department of Justice and the states.
232 Shortly after 
the complaints were filed Judge Jackson concluded, upon Micro-
soft’s motion,
233 that the cases were substantially similar and ordered 
them consolidated.
234 
In Part III.A, we explain the government’s theory of liability in 
the 1998 lawsuit against M icrosoft. In Part III.B, we summarize 
Judge Jackson’s 1999 findings of fact. In Part III.C, we summarize 
Judge Jackson’s 2000 findings of law.  
A.  The Government’s Theory of Liability in the 1998 Lawsuit  
Against Microsoft  
In their 1998 lawsuit against Microsoft, the Justice Department 
and the states alleged that over the course of several years Microsoft 
purposefully engaged in a series of actions—involving competitors, 
distributors of Internet browsers, and computer manufacturers—
designed to preserve Microsoft’s dominance in the personal com-
puter operating systems market and to extend that monopoly to the 
Internet browser market.
235 More specifically, the Department and 
the states argued that Microsoft committed two violations of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act by entering into certain exclusive dealing and 
tying arrangements that served to restrain competition in the Inter-
net browser and PC operating systems markets.
236 The government 
                                                                                                                                                      
231  Complaint, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 18, 
1998) (“DOJ Microsoft Complaint”); Complaint, New York v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-
1233 (D DC filed May 18, 1998). The states submitted a revised complaint on July 17, 1998. Re-
vised Complaint, New York v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1233 (D DC filed July 17, 1998) 
(“State Microsoft Complaint).” The states participating in the July 17, 1998, complaint were: 
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. On December 7, 1998, 
South Carolina withdrew from the states’ case.  
232  See Ted Bridis, Feds, 18 States to File Antitrust Suits Against Microsoft, Denver Post C3 
(May 14, 1998). 
233  See Motion of Defendant Microsoft Corporation to Consolidate, United States v Micro-
soft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232 (D DC filed May 21, 1998).  
234  See United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No 98-1232, slip op at 1 (D DC May 22, 
1998). In a subsequent order denying in the main Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment, 
Judge Jackson explained that “[t]he complaints allege essentially the same antitrust violations” 
and “seek virtually the same relief.” United States v Microsoft Corp, 1998-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 
72,261 at 82,668 (D DC 1998).  
235  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 1–38, 53–123 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Com-
plaint at ¶¶ 9–78 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law, United 
States v Microsoft Corp, Nos 98-1232, 1–2, 2–54, 66–70 (D DC filed Dec 6, 1999) (“Plaintiffs’ Pro-
posed Conclusions of Law”). 
236  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 130–37 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 93–97 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1–2, 54–66 (cited in 154  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
also argued that through the same exclusive dealing and tying ar-
rangements, as well as other behavior,  Microsoft illegally main-
tained its alleged  monopoly power in the PC operating systems 
market and attempted to monopolize the Internet browser mar-
ket
237—actions which constituted two violations of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.
238  
The cornerstone of the government’s case against Microsoft was 
its contention that Microsoft wielded monopoly power in the market 
for operating systems for Intel-based PCs.
239 An operating system, as 
the government explained, coordinates the interactions between a 
PC’s central processing functions and both its hardware components 
and software applications. In this regard, an operating system is of-
ten called a “platform” for software applications.
240 Software applica-
tions communicate with the operating system through the system’s 
application programming interfaces (“APIs”).
241 The APIs in turn al-
low software applications to use “the operating system’s underlying 
software routines in order to perform various functions, such as dis-
playing a character on a monitor.”
242 The Department of Justice ob-
served that Microsoft’s Windows product was the operating system 
in use in over 80 percent of Intel-based PCs and was being installed 
in over 90 percent of new PCs.
243 
The government argued that Microsoft retained monopoly 
power in the operating systems market because OEMs had no com-
mercially practical alternative to Microsoft’s Windows. They lacked 
                                                                                                                                                      
note 235). 
237  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 138–41 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 85–90 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1–54 (cited in note 
235). 
238  In addition to the four Sherman Act claims described above, the states asserted a fifth 
claim under the Sherman Act arguing that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by 
engaging in monopoly leveraging. That claim was not included in the federal complaint and 
was disposed of by the court on summary judgment. State Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 85–90 
(cited in note 231). 
239  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 1–6, 57–60 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Com-
plaint at ¶¶ 17, 22–27 (cited in note 231). According to the Department of Justice’s complaint, 
Intel-based PCs were the most widely used PCs in the United States. DOJ Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶ 2 (cited in note 231).  
240  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 54, 66 (cited in note 231). See also State Microsoft 
Complaint at ¶¶ 9–10 (cited in note 231) (asserting that software applications “run on top of” 
operating systems). 
241  State Microsoft Complaint at ¶ 10 (cited in note 231).  
242  Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civil Action 
No 98-1232 ¶ 8.2 (D DC filed Aug 10, 1999) (“Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact”).  
243  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶ 2 (cited in note 231). The Department of Justice con-
tended that Microsoft, which manufactured a number of operating systems, enjoyed in excess 
of an 80 percent share of the PC operating systems market overall. Id at ¶¶ 57–58. The states 
argued in their complaint that Microsoft controlled over 90 percent of this overall market. 
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a suitable alternative, the government contended, because the oper-
ating systems market is characterized by economies of scale in soft-
ware production and network effects that create high barriers to suc-
cessful entry. The Department of Justice explained that, for an oper-
ating system to be used widely, it must support numerous software 
applications d esired by consumers. In turn, software writers will 
create new applications to run on operating systems that are widely 
used to make such applications attractive to the greatest number of 
potential consumers. The more widely used an operating system is, 
therefore, the more likely it is to become further embraced by con-
sumers.
244 Judge Jackson subsequently used the phrase “applications 
barrier to entry” to describe this burden to would-be competitors of 
Microsoft.
245 
This entry-cost rendition of the applications barrier to entry, 
however, requires closer scrutiny. Viewed slightly differently, the 
applications barrier to entry results not from sunk costs, but from 
the chicken-and-egg problem created by path dependence: Consum-
ers want to use an operating system with many applications. Appli-
cations writers want to write for an operating system with many 
consumers. So once an operating system becomes successful, con-
sumers will not buy a different one, and applications writers will not 
write for a different one.  
Although the government argued that Microsoft faced no mean-
ingful actual competition from alternate operating systems, it none-
theless contended that software products existed that were potential 
competitive threats to Microsoft’s operating system monopoly. 
These products included Internet browsers—most notably, Net-
scape’s Navigator browser, the first browser to gain widespread use 
by the public—and the Java technologies, a new programming lan-
guage produced by Sun Microsystems.
246 The Department of Justice 
explained that Internet browsers allow computer users to “conven-
iently . . . locate, access, display, and manipulate content and appli-
cations located” on the World Wide Web,
247 and Java “is designed in 
                                                                                                                                                      
244  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 2–3, 57–60, 66–68 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft 
Complaint at ¶¶ 15–21 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 9–12 
(cited in note 235). In prior proceedings between the Department of Justice and Microsoft, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized that the software industry is character-
ized by “increasing returns to scale and network externalities.” United States v Microsoft, 147 
F3d 935, 939 (DC Cir 1998). See also United States v Microsoft, 56 F3d 1448, 1452 (DC Cir 1995) 
(“It is undisputed that the software market is characterized by ‘increasing returns,’ resulting in 
natural barriers to entry.”). 
245  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d 9,  ¶¶ 30–31 (D DC 1999).  
246  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 4–9, 61–68 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Com-
plaint at ¶¶ 32–37 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 14–15, 21–24 
(cited in note 235).  
247  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 56, 63 (cited in note 231). See also State Microsoft 156  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
part to permit applications written in it to be run on different operat-
ing systems.”
248  
Internet browsers and the Java technologies, the government 
argued, have two characteristics that make them potential competi-
tive threats to Microsoft’s Windows operating system. First, they are 
cross-platform technologies, meaning that they are designed to run 
on a number of existing operating systems, including Windows. 
Second, in addition to other functions that they perform, because 
they expose their own APIs,
249 they have the potential to serve as 
platforms for the software applications that currently run on Win-
dows.
250 To the extent that Internet browsers and the Java technolo-
gies can support numerous software applications and can run on 
operating systems other then Windows, they could, according to the 
government’s theory, break down the applications barrier to entry 
into the PC operating systems market and thereby diminish Micro-
soft’s alleged monopoly power.
251 
The government’s complaint argued that, as early as 1995, Mi-
crosoft recognized the threat that these new technologies posed to 
the applications barrier to entry and, therefore, to Microsoft’s operat-
ing system monopoly. In response, M icrosoft introduced in mid-
1995 its own competing Internet browser product—the Internet Ex-
plorer (“IE”). The government argued that Microsoft moreover 
sought to prevent competing Internet browsers and the Java tech-
nologies from gaining widespread use among consumers so that 
those technologies would not become economically attractive to sig-
nificant numbers of software writers as alternate platforms for soft-
ware applications.  
The Department of Justice contended that, as the first step in its 
alleged campaign, Microsoft sought the agreement of Netscape to 
divide the Internet browser market between browsers compatible 
with Windows (Microsoft’s share) and browsers that can run on 
platforms other than Windows (Netscape’s share).
252 Upon Net-
                                                                                                                                                      
Complaint at ¶ 28 (cited in note 231). 
248  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 7, 63 (cited in note 231). See also State Microsoft Com-
plaint at ¶ 36 (cited in note 231).  
249  Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact at ¶¶ 53.2–53.3, 58.1.1–58.2 (cited in note 242).  
250  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 7–9 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint at 
¶¶ 32–37 (cited in note 231).  
251  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 4–9, 66–68 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Com-
plaint at ¶¶ 32–37 (cited in note 231). In prior proceedings between the Department of Justice 
and Microsoft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said: “Wide-
spread use of multi-platform browsers as user interfaces has some potential to reduce any mo-
nopoly-increasing effects of network externalities in the operating systems market.” Microsoft, 
147 F3d at 939. 
252  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 14, 70–74 (cited in note 231). See also Plaintiffs’ Pro-
posed Conclusions of Law at 24–25 (cited in note 235). The states contended that Microsoft had 2000]  Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries  157 
scape’s refusal, the government alleged, Microsoft sought to fore-
close Netscape’s distribution to consumers by entering into agree-
ments with OEMs, Internet service providers (“ISPs”), online service 
providers (“OLSs”), and Internet content providers (“ICPs”) that re-
quired them to distribute, promote, purchase, or use IE and that sig-
nificantly limited their ability to distribute or promote competing 
Internet browsers—including Netscape’s Navigator.
253 
The government further contended that Microsoft, besides 
limiting the distribution of  Navigator, which in itself was an 
important distribution vehicle for Java, took a number of steps 
specifically to limit the distribution of cross-platform Java. The 
government argued that Microsoft offered developers Java tools 
that, when used to write software applications, produced 
applications that would run properly only on Windows and were 
difficult to port to other operating systems. According to the 
government, Microsoft failed to warn developers that these tools 
would negate the cross-platform nature of Java applications. The 
government also argued that Microsoft threatened to withhold 
information regarding Windows from software developers using 
cross-platform technologies. Microsoft’s a ctions significantly 
impaired “the ability of Java to develop into a truly robust” software 
platform and, thereby, to erode the applications barrier to entry.
254 
In assessing Microsoft’s legal liability, the government charac-
terized the agreements into which Microsoft had entered with ISPs, 
ICPs, OLSs, and OEMs as exclusionary and argued that because 
these agreements inhibited competition in the Internet browser mar-
ket, and concomitantly in the PC operating systems market, without 
serving a procompetitive purpose, they violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.
255 In addition, the government argued that IE and Win-
                                                                                                                                                      
recognized the threat that Internet browsers posed to its operating system monopoly as early 
as October 1994. They argued that Microsoft first sought to combat this threat by seeking to 
acquire the rights to Netscape’s Navigator. Upon Netscape’s refusal, according to the states, 
Microsoft then sought to divide the browser market with Netscape. State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 40–45 (cited in note 231).  
253  The Department of Justice and the states conceded that Microsoft had modified some 
of these agreements. They argued, however, that the modifications were too limited to remove 
all anticompetitive aspects of the agreements, did not ameliorate past anticompetitive effects, 
and could be withdrawn at any time. DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 10–15, 17–22, 26–34, 61–
64, 75–103 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 45–55, 57, 62–78 (cited in note 
231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 26–38 (cited in note 235).  
254  Id at 47. 
255  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 130–33 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 78, 97 (cited in note 231). Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 63–66 (cited in note 
235). To demonstrate that a defendant has violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering 
into exclusionary agreements a plaintiff must show, in general, that the agreements restricted 
competition by foreclosing a significant amount of supply or outlet capacity, and that they 
served no procompetitive purpose. Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co, 365 US 320, 327–35 158  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
Windows are separate products under antitrust tying law,
256 and that 
Microsoft’s integration of these two products served to restrain 
competition in the Internet browser market and thus constituted an 
illegal tie in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
257  
The government further argued that to the extent Microsoft’s il-
legal tie-ins, illegal exclusionary contracts, and other behaviors pro-
moting IE served significantly to limit competition in the Internet 
browser market, Microsoft was guilty of attempted monopolization 
of this market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
258 Finally, 
the government alleged most forcefully that these same actions 
served to erode potential competitive threats to Microsoft’s operat-
ing systems monopoly, and that Microsoft thereby illegally main-
                                                                                                                                                      
(1961) (holding an exclusive dealing agreement not in violation of Section 1 because it did not 
foreclose competition).  
256  The government concluded that IE and Windows are separate products under anti-
trust tying law by applying the consumer separate demand test articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 462 (1992) (conducting 
separate inquiries into market power in the two tied markets), and Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist 
No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 19–23 (1984) (examining the character of the demand for individual 
items in an allged tying arrangement). Plaintiff’s Proposed Conclusions of Law at 54–61 (cited 
in note 235). Under this test, a court would conclude that two products are separate if there is 
sufficient consumer demand for the products on a separate basis, and, thus, vendors find it ef-
ficient to provide the two products separately. Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 462; Jefferson Parish, 
466 US at 21–22. The government reached the same conclusion, however, by applying a stan-
dard that the D.C. Circuit articulated in Microsoft Corp, 147 F3d at 935. In this case the D.C. Cir-
cuit developed a standard to determine whether Windows and IE are “integrated” or separate 
products under the terms of the Justice Department’s and Microsoft’s 1995 consent decree. In 
general, under the D.C. Circuit’s standard, two items that are technologically commingled are 
a single, “integrated” product if the commingled product offers benefits beyond that which a 
consumer might obtain if the consumer separately purchased and then combined the two 
items or functionalities herself. Id at 948–53. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Role 
for Software Integration, 18 Yale J Reg (2001). [new snc] 
257  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 134–37 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 28–31, 93–95 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 54–63 (cited 
in note 235). To demonstrate under a per se rule that a defendant has illegally tied one product 
to another in violation of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the tying and the tied 
products are really two separate products; (2) the defendant conditioned the sale of the tying 
product on the purchase of the tied product; (3) the defendant had sufficient economic power 
in the market for the tying product to restrain competition in the market for the tied product; 
and (4) a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the interstate market for the tied product 
was affected. Eastman Kodak, 504 US at 461–62. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc v Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Legal & Professional Pub, Inc, 63 F3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir 1995) (applying the Kodak 
test to the market for bar review courses). 
258  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 140–41 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 88–92 (cited in note 231); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 66–70 (cited in note 
235). To prove that a defendant has attempted to monopolize a market, a plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct with the specific intent of 
monopolizing the market and that there was a dangerous probability that the defendant 
would in fact monopolize the market. Spectrum Sports, Inc v McQuillan, 506 US 447, 456 (1993). 2000]  Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries  159 
tained its monopoly in the PC operating systems market in violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
259  
B.  Judge Jackson’s 1999 Findings of Fact 
On November 5, 1999, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued 
his findings of fact in the Microsoft case overwhelmingly supporting 
the factual allegations made by the government.
260 In short, Judge 
Jackson found that Intel-compatible PC operating systems constitute 
the relevant product market
261 and that Microsoft holds monopoly 
power
262 in that market.
263 He also agreed with the bulk of the gov-
ernment’s contentions regarding Microsoft’s actions over the past 
decade. Most significantly for assessing Microsoft’s legal liability, he 
concluded that these actions “could only have been advantageous if 
they operated to reinforce monopoly power,”
264 and that while they 
bestowed some benefits on consumers, in the main they harmed 
them by inhibiting competition and innovation in the computer in-
dustry.
265 We discuss these findings in greater detail below.  
1.  The relevant market. 
Judge Jackson affirmed the government’s contention that the 
relevant market for purposes of evaluating whether Microsoft 
wields monopoly power is the worldwide market for Intel-
compatible PC operating systems.
266 For the majority of consumers, 
                                                                                                                                                      
259  DOJ Microsoft Complaint at ¶¶ 138–39 (cited in note 231); State Microsoft Complaint 
at ¶¶ 85–87 (cited in note 231); Plaintiff’s Proposed Conclusions of Law at 2–3, 21–23, 44–47, 
52–54 (cited in note 235). To demonstrate that a defendant is guilty of the offense of illegally 
maintaining monopoly power, a plaintiff must show that the defendant retains monopoly 
power in the market and that it deliberately maintained that power through means other than 
the development “of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v 
Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 570–71 (1966).  
260  Judge Jackson said of his findings: “Virtually everything I did may be vulnerable on 
appeal.” Peter Spiegel, Microsoft Judge Defends Himself Against Charges of Misconduct: Software 
Giant Appeals Judge’s Breakup Judgment, Fin Times 4 (Oct 7, 2000). 
261  In antitrust analysis the term “relevant market” refers to the market in which the de-
fendant’s alleged monopoly power or anticompetitive behavior is to be assessed. The relevant 
market has two dimensions, the product market and the geographic market. The former iden-
tifies “the producers or sellers of products that compete to some substantial degree with the 
product in question,” and the latter identifies the “area of effective competition . . . in which 
the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.” ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law, 1 Antitrust Law Developments 233, 449, 532–33 (4th ed 1997) (citations omit-
ted). 
262  In antitrust law, monopoly power is “the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion.” United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377, 391 (1956). 
263  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d 9, ¶¶ 18–66 (D DC 1999). 
264  Id at ¶ 67.  
265  Id at ¶¶ 408–12. 
266  Id at ¶ 18. Judge Jackson rejected Microsoft’s contention that a relevant market de-
fined to include only Intel-compatible PC operating systems is too narrow for purposes of ad-160  The University of Chicago Law Review  [68:93 
Judge Jackson stated, currently and in all likelihood in the near fu-
ture, there are no substitutes for Intel-compatible PC operating sys-
tems that would not engender significant costs.
267  
On the demand side, Judge Jackson concluded that consumers 
do not perceive Intel-compatible server operating systems, non-
Intel-compatible PC operating systems (including Apple’s Mac OS 
operating system),
268 network computers, server-based computing 
through browsers, other information a ppliances
269 such as smart 
wireless phones and hand-held computers, or middleware, to be 
substitutes for an Intel-compatible PC operating system.
270 Middle-
ware, Judge Jackson explained, refers to software programs, such as 
Internet browsers and Sun’s Java class libraries, that expose their 
own APIs to software application developers while relying on the 
APIs of the underlying operating system to run. 
Judge Jackson also rejected the possibility of supply-side substi-
tution. He agreed with the government’s contention that there is an 
applications barrier to entry into the Intel-compatible PC operating 
systems market.
271 Judge Jackson explained that while a firm could 
develop a new operating system, and some firms have, it would take 
years before such a system could support the breadth of applications 
that currently run on Windows and thus offer consumers a mean-
ingful alternative.
272 He found similar hurdles to impede supply-side 
substitution by middleware developers or server-based systems, 
noting that it would take years before they offered consumers a real-
                                                                                                                                                      
dressing the factual question of whether Microsoft wields monopoly power. Microsoft had ar-
gued that to assess this question, Judge Jackson should not employ a structural approach that 
determines “the geographic and product boundaries for an identifiable market,” and then ana-
lyzes the market shares of the firms within that market. Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s 
Revised Proposed Findings of Fact, United States v Microsoft Corp, Civ Action No 98-1232, ¶ 132 
(D DC filed Sept 10, 1999) (“Microsoft’s Proposed Findings of Fact”). Rather, Judge Jackson 
should employ a behavioral approach that requires a court to identify whether there are any 
limits on an alleged monopolist’s ability to raise prices or exclude entry, and on whether the 
alleged monopolist’s behavior is consistent with the retention of monopoly power. Microsoft 
argued that this latter approach more accurately assesses the dynamics of the marketplace, 
and that under this approach Judge Jackson should consider “the impact of competition be-
tween Windows and all other platform software.” Id at ¶ 155. 
267  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at ¶ 21. 
268  Judge Jackson noted, however, that inclusion of the Mac OS in the relevant market 
would not change his conclusion regarding the degree of Microsoft’s market power. Id at ¶ 21.  
269  Judge Jackson noted that within the next few years it is possible that information ap-
pliances, alone or in combination, might be substitutable for Intel-compatible PC operating 
systems for what Judge Jackson determined is a small percentage of consumers who do not 
use all of the features of their PC. Id at ¶ 23.  
270  Id at ¶¶ 19–29. Microsoft had argued that all of these products compete with Win-
dows in its function as a software applications platform and thereby serve to constrain Micro-
soft’s pricing ability. Microsoft’s Proposed Findings of Fact at ¶ 199–239 (cited in note 266). 
271  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at ¶¶ 30–31. See also id at ¶¶ 36–44. 
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istic alternative to Windows because of the applications barrier to 
entry.
273 
2.  Microsoft’s power in the relevant market. 
In antitrust analysis, monopoly power is defined as “the power 
to control market prices or exclude competition.”
274 Judge Jackson 
concluded that Microsoft wields monopoly power in the market for 
Intel-compatible PC operating systems because it could charge more 
for Windows than it could have in a competitive market, and that it 
could do so for a sustained period of time without losing a signifi-
cant number of customers.
275 We discuss more fully below Judge 
Jackson’s conclusions regarding Microsoft’s market power. 
a) Market share and barriers to entry. To reach his conclusion 
that Microsoft had market power, Judge Jackson evaluated the firm’s 
market share, often viewed by courts as the most significant indicia 
of market power,
276 or at a minimum, as the starting point in any 
monopoly power analysis.
277 Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft 
retains a “dominant, persistent and increasing share” worldwide in 
the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. Over the last 
few years, he found, this share has stood at 95 percent.
278  
The court found Windows’ dominant position to be insulated 
from competition because of the large number of software applica-
tions that Windows supports.
279 Judge Jackson concluded that it 
would be prohibitively expensive for a new operating system ven-
dor to recreate the seventy thousand plus applications that currently 
run on Windows and that software vendors will not write for a new 
system until they are confident that it will be well established.
280 Mi-
crosoft never faced the same entry barriers that a new entrant must 
confront, Judge Jackson found, because it never confronted a “highly 
penetrated market dominated by a single competitor.”
281 
                                                                                                                                                      
273  Id at ¶ 32. 
274  United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377, 391 (1956).  
275  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at ¶ 33. 
276  See Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 464 (1992) (“The exis-
tence of [market] power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant 
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277  ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 1 Antitrust Law Developments at 234–42 (cited in note 
261). 
278  Judge Jackson determined that even if he included Apple’s Mac OS in the relevant 
market, Microsoft’s market share would still register over 80 percent. Findings of Fact, 84 F 
Supp 2d at ¶ 35. 
279  Id at ¶¶ 36–44. 
280  Id at ¶¶ 40–41.  
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b) Price Restraints on Microsoft and Microsoft’s pricing behavior. 
Although Judge Jackson acknowledged that the evidence available 
at trial did not allow him to determine with confidence the monop-
oly price for Windows, he nevertheless cited certain factors as in-
dicative of Microsoft’s power over price. These factors include: Mi-
crosoft’s failure to consider competitors’ prices, Microsoft’s decision 
to price Windows 95 at the same price as Windows 98,
282 an internal 
document showing that Microsoft had wide latitude in the price it 
could charge for Windows 98, and the fact that Microsoft price dis-
criminates in the licensing fees for Windows.
283 Judge Jackson con-
cluded that even if Microsoft charges less than the full monopoly 
price, this does not mean that it does not have monopoly power. Mi-
crosoft, Judge Jackson declared, uses a substantial part of its monop-
oly power to impose “burdensome restrictions on its customers” de-
signed to increase and maintain its market dominance.
284 
Judge Jackson dismissed Microsoft’s contention that it could not 
wield monopoly power because it invests large sums in research and 
development, noting that even monopolists have incentives to inno-
vate. He similarly rejected Microsoft’s arguments that its monopoly 
power was constrained by its installed base, piracy, and long-term 
threats from alternative technologies. 
3.  Middleware threats to Microsoft’s operating system 
monopoly. 
Judge Jackson concluded that, beginning in the spring of 1995, 
Microsoft perceived the emergence of cross-platform middleware, 
such as Netscape’s Navigator browser and Sun’s Java class libraries, 
as threats to its monopoly power.
285 Judge Jackson explained that 
Microsoft feared these technologies because they were well posi-
tioned to serve as platforms for “network-centric applications that 
run in association with Web pages,”
286 they could run on multiple 
operating systems (hence called “cross-platform”), and they exposed 
                                                                                                                                                      
282  Judge Jackson explained that in a competitive market one would expect the price of an 
older version of a product to “stay the same or decrease.” Id at ¶ 62.  
283  Id at ¶¶ 62–66. See Coal Exporters Assn of the United States v United States, 745 F2d 76, 91 
(D DC 1984) (“[T]he ability of a firm to price discriminate is an indicator of significant monop-
oly power.”). Because Judge Jackson’s findings of fact contained no citations or footnotes ex-
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soft did introduce evidence concerning prices of forty-nine to eighty-nine dollars for upgrades, 
which counted for a small percentage of sales and had different characteristics from OEM 
sales. 
284  Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 2d at ¶ 66. 
285  Id at ¶¶ 68–77. Judge Jackson noted that Microsoft recognized Java as a threat to its 
monopoly power in the spring of 1996. Id at ¶ 75.  
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their own APIs upon which software developers could rely in lieu of 
the APIs in the underlying operating system. Microsoft recognized, 
Judge Jackson concluded, that if middleware programs b ecame 
widely used, and at the same time exposed sufficient numbers of 
APIs to support the advanced, full-featured applications that run on 
Windows, then large numbers of software developers would have 
sufficient incentive to write applications that relied entirely on mid-
dleware APIs, and developers and consumers alike would no longer 
be reliant on Windows as an applications platform. In this manner, 
middleware could potentially “dissipate” the positive feedback loop 
that supports the applications barrier to entry and, in the parlance of 
Microsoft’s worst fears, turn Windows into a commodity.
287 
Although Judge Jackson concluded that the threat to Microsoft’s 
operating system monopoly posed by middleware technologies was 
not imminent because these technologies exposed significantly fewer 
APIs than Windows, and thus could not support the full-featured 
applications that Windows supports,
288 he found that Microsoft nev-
ertheless feared these technologies because of the potential threat 
that they posed.
289 We discuss Judge Jackson’s conclusions regarding 
Microsoft’s response to these potential threats in the following two 
sections. 
a) Microsoft’s response to the browser threat. Based on the evi-
dence at trial, Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft first sought to 
contain the threat posed by Navigator by seeking Netscape’s agree-
ment, in mid-1995, to divide the browser market.
290 Judge Jackson 
found that Microsoft hoped to induce Netscape not to expose the 
APIs in the Windows version of its browser so that Navigator would 
not compete as a platform-level browser able to support software 
applications. In exchange, Microsoft would cede the non-Windows 
browser market to Netscape, provide Netscape with technical assis-
tance to develop browser applications that relied on Microsoft’s 
Internet technologies, and provide Netscape with preferential access 
to technical information that Netscape needed to create a Windows 
version of its browser.
291 When Netscape refused Microsoft’s pro-
posal, Microsoft delayed the provision of Windows technical infor-
mation to Netscape. The court found that the delay prevented Net-
scape from releasing the Windows 95 version of its browser until 
                                                                                                                                                      
287  Id at ¶ 72. 
288  Id at ¶ 77. 
289  Id. 
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tions barrier to entry. Id at ¶ 89. 
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several months after Microsoft’s retail release of Windows 95 and 
IE,
292 thereby maximizing IE’s market share at “Navigator’s e x-
pense.”
293  
Judge Jackson found, however, that Microsoft also competed on 
quality and price. Specifically, from 1995 onwards Microsoft spent 
more than one hundred million dollars annually in efforts to im-
prove the quality of IE to the point where industry reviewers were 
split over whether IE or Navigator was the superior product.
294 Mi-
crosoft also spent thirty million dollars annually promoting IE.
295 
Judge Jackson further found that Microsoft bundled IE with Win-
dows 95, later technically integrated IE with Windows 98, and of-
fered IE for free. Microsoft did this despite its large monetary in-
vestment in the product and the potential to obtain significant reve-
nues from its sale. Judge Jackson conceded that Microsoft might 
have given IE away for free to respond to competition rather than to 
preserve the applications barrier to entry.
296 He concluded, however, 
that the determination to preserve that barrier “was the main force 
driving its decision to price the product at zero.”
297 
Accordingly, the court agreed with the government’s evidence 
that Microsoft acted to foreclose to Navigator the two browser dis-
tribution channels that “lead most efficiently to browser usage:” the 
OEM and IAP channels.
298  
Judge Jackson also concluded that browsers and operating sys-
tems are two separate products because consumers seek to purchase 
them separately, and there is general agreement within the software 
industry that the functionalities that these two products provide are 
distinct.
299 Noting Microsoft’s argument that other vendors bundle 
browsers with their operating systems, Judge Jackson concluded 
that Microsoft is the only vendor that does not give OEMs and con-
sumers the choice either not to install the browser or to uninstall it.
300 
Given the government’s demonstration at trial that IE can be re-
moved without negatively affecting the functionality of Windows, 
                                                                                                                                                      
292  Id at ¶¶ 90–92.  
293  Id at ¶¶ 133–36. 
294  Id at ¶¶ 134–36.  
295  Id at ¶ 140. 
296  Id. 
297  Id at ¶ 136. 
298  Id at ¶¶ 143–48.  
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consumers do not want a browser with their operating system, and corporate consumers using 
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Judge Jackson concluded that there is no technical reason to prohibit 
consumers from removing IE from Windows.
301 
He further found that the integration of IE and Windows re-
duced the speed of a PC for consumers, a clear downside for con-
sumers who did not want a browser.
302 Finally, Judge Jackson con-
cluded that Microsoft integrated IE into Windows not for any pro-
competitive purpose, but purely to restrict Navigator’s distribution 
and to stop “Navigator from weakening the applications barrier to 
entry.”
303  
b) Microsoft’s response to the threat posed by Sun Microsystems’s im-
plementation of Java. Sun Microsystems designed the Java program-
ming language to allow applications written in Java to run on any 
operating system. Java allowed developers to write software with 
advanced functionality by relying on some of the APIs in the under-
lying operating system. Judge Jackson found that, in response, Mi-
crosoft took actions that made it difficult to take Java-based applica-
tions that relied on Windows APIs and port them into non-Windows 
environments.
304 
Microsoft, Judge Jackson found, also refused to include new 
Java libraries in IE that expanded the ability of Java to support full-
featured applications because this would make applications more 
easily portable.
305 Microsoft also attempted to thwart the develop-
ment of additional Java class libraries by threatening to withhold 
Windows operating systems support from Intel’s microprocessors 
and other threats to induce Intel to stop helping Sun develop Java 
class libraries. Judge Jackson found that Intel acquiesced.
306  
Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft would not have acted 
to make it more difficult to port Java applications absent its com-
mitment to preserve the applications barrier to entry.
307 
C.  Judge Jackson’s 2000 Conclusions of Law 
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued his conclusions of law.
308 
He concluded that “Microsoft maintained its monopoly power by 
                                                                                                                                                      
301  Id at ¶¶ 175–85.  
302  Id at ¶ 173. 
303  Id at ¶ 155. 
304  Id at ¶¶ 387–89.  
305  Id at ¶¶ 386–94. 
306  Id at ¶¶ 393–406.  
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anticompetitive means and attempted to monopolize the Web 
browser market, both in violation of § 2,” and that “Microsoft also 
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully tying its Web browser 
to its operating system.”
309 Judge Jackson, however, found in Micro-
soft’s favor on the claim that its “marketing arrangements with other 
companies constituted unlawful exclusive dealing under criteria es-
tablished by leading decisions under § 1.”
310 Conceptually, Judge 
Jackson divided his discussion into three sections: claims based on 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, claims based on Section 1, and claims 
based on state law. We summarize here his findings only with re-
spect to the first two categories. 
1.  Claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Judge Jackson reiterated that “there are currently no products—
and that there are not likely to be any in the near future—that a sig-
nificant percentage of computer users worldwide could substitute 
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems without incurring sub-
stantial costs.”
311 Those facts created a presumption that Microsoft 
had m onopoly power,
312 which Microsoft failed to rebut.
313 Judge 
Jackson added that 
over the past several years, Microsoft has comported itself in a 
way that could only be consistent with rational behavior for a 
profit-maximizing firm if the firm knew that it possessed 
monopoly power, and if it was motivated by a desire to 
preserve the barrier to entry protecting that power.
314 
Judge Jackson then considered whether Microsoft maintained 
its monopoly power by anticompetitive means. He noted that “[i]f 
the evidence reveals a significant exclusionary impact in the relevant 
market,” then “liability will attach—unless the defendant comes 
forward with specific, procompetitive business motivations that ex-
plain the full extent of its exclusionary conduct.”
315  
Judge Jackson then considered in greater detail Microsoft’s con-
duct with respect to Netscape’s Navigator and its conduct with re-
spect to Sun’s Java technology.  
                                                                                                                                                      
309  Id at 35. 
310  Id. On the claims for which he found Microsoft liable under federal antitrust law, 
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311  Id at 36. 
312  Id at 36–37, citing United States v AT&T Co, 524 F Supp 1336, 1347–48 (D DC 1981), affd 
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Judge Jackson accepted all of the government’s arguments that 
Microsoft’s conduct with respect to Netscape’s Navigator or Sun’s 
Java technology was anticompetitive. He concluded, among other 
things, that Microsoft lacked any legitimate business justification for 
its decision not to offer a “browserless” version of Windows 98 to 
consumers and OEMs.
316 Judge Jackson stated that “Microsoft’s deci-
sion to tie Internet Explorer to Windows cannot truly be explained 
as an attempt to benefit consumers and improve the efficiency of the 
software market generally, but rather as part of a larger campaign to 
quash innovation that threatened its monopoly position.”
317 With re-
spect to Java, Judge Jackson found in the government’s favor that, 
“[a]s part of its grand strategy to protect the applications barrier, 
Microsoft employed an array of tactics designed to maximize the dif-
ficulty with which applications written in Java could be ported from 
Windows to other platforms, and vice versa.”
318 
Judge Jackson emphasized, however, that Microsoft’s actions 
should be viewed in totality to appreciate their significance for pur-
poses of determining liability under Section 2: 
Microsoft’s campaign to protect the applications barrier from 
erosion by network-centric middleware can be broken down 
into discrete categories of activity. But only when the separate 
categories of conduct are viewed, as they should be, as a single, 
well-coordinated course of action does the full extent of the vio-
lence that Microsoft has done to the competitive process reveal 
itself. In essence, Microsoft mounted a deliberate assault upon 
entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise or fall on their own mer-
its, could well have enabled the introduction of competition 
into the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.
319 
Judge Jackson also concluded that the totality of the facts reinforced 
the conclusion that Microsoft was, in his words, “predacious.”
320 For 
these reasons, Judge Jackson found Microsoft liable for monopoliza-
tion in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
In addition to finding that Microsoft’s conduct toward Netscape 
constituted actual monopolization of the market for Intel-compatible 
PC operating systems, Judge Jackson found that the same evidence 
supported a finding that Microsoft had engaged in attempted mo-
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nopolization of the market for Internet browsers.
321 He therefore 
found Microsoft liable under Section 2 for attempting to obtain mo-
nopoly power in a second market by anticompetitive means. 
2.  Claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act through tying arrangements, but that Microsoft did not 
so violate the law through its exclusive dealing arrangements.  
With respect to tying, Judge Jackson agreed with the govern-
ment that “Microsoft’s combination of Windows and Internet Ex-
plorer by contractual and technological artifices constitutes unlawful 
tying to the extent that those actions forced Microsoft’s customers 
and consumers to take Internet Explorer as a condition of obtaining 
Windows.”
322 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Jackson ruled that 
the applicable precedent for evaluating Microsoft’s product bun-
dling was not the D.C. Circuit’s 1998 decision in United States v Mi-
crosoft,
323 but rather the Supreme Court’s decisions in Eastman Kodak 
Co v Image Technical Services, Inc
324 and Jefferson Parish Hospital District 
No 2 v Hyde,
325 neither of which specifically concerned product inte-
gration in the computer software industry.
326 Judge Jackson stated: 
“The fact that Microsoft ostensibly priced Internet Explorer at zero 
does not detract from the conclusion that consumers were forced to 
pay, one way or another, for the browser along with Windows.”
327 
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft had not violated Section 1 
by imposing exclusive dealing a rrangements in contracts with 
“some OLSs, ICPs, ISVs, Compaq and Apple” that required those 
firms “to promote and distribute Internet Explorer to the partial or 
complete exclusion of Navigator.”
328 He observed: 
Notwithstanding the extent to which these “exclusive” distribu-
tion agreements preempted the most efficient channels for 
Navigator to achieve browser usage share, . . . Microsoft’s mul-
tiple agreements with distributors did not ultimately deprive 
Netscape of the ability to have access to every PC user world-
wide . . . . [I]n 1998 alone, for example, Netscape was able to 
distribute 160 million copies of Navigator, contributing to an 
increase in its installed base from 15 million in 1996 to 33 mil-
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lion in December 1998. As such, the evidence does not support 
a finding that these agreements completely excluded Netscape 
from any constituent portion of the worldwide browser market, 
the relevant line of commerce.
329 
Nonetheless, Judge Jackson emphasized that “[t]he fact that Micro-
soft’s arrangements with various firms did not foreclose enough of 
the relevant market to constitute a § 1 violation in no way detracts 
from the Court’s assignment of liability for the same arrangements 
under § 2.”
330 
IV.  ECONOMIC WELFARE AND DIVESTITURE IN MICROSOFT 
Shortly after the Justice Department and the states filed their 
complaints against Microsoft in 1998, Judge Jackson bifurcated the 
case into a liability phase and a remedies phase.
331 Once the liability 
phase was completed with the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law discussed above, the district court turned to the question of the 
appropriate remedy.  
Before, during, and after the liability phase of the trial, a num-
ber of scholars and former government officials in law and econom-
ics proposed remedies to cure the competitive problems alleged by 
the government or subsequently identified in Judge Jackson’s find-
ings of fact.
332 Some of these commentators disputed the need for any 
remedy (on the rationale that Microsoft’s conduct did not violate the 
antitrust laws), while others advocated the whole range of possible 
remedies. Robert Hall proposed a framework for calculating dam-
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ages that would be imposed on Microsoft.
333 Others proposed behav-
ioral remedies that included (1) explicit and implicit line-of-business 
restrictions; (2) compulsory licensing of the source code for Win-
dows; and (3) mandatory access to the Windows platform.
334 Pro-
posed structural remedies included (1) a vertical divestiture of Mi-
crosoft into distinct companies along lines of business (that is, oper-
ating systems (“OS”) software, applications programs, and Internet 
services, sites, and products); (2) a horizontal divestiture of multiple, 
vertically integrated firms; and (3) a vertical separation along lines of 
business (OS software, applications, and Internet) and then a further 
horizontal breakup of the OS division into multiple, equal parts.
335 In 
the end, the government asked for a structural injunction requiring 
vertical divestiture of Microsoft into two separate companies, one 
engaged in the operating-systems business and the other in the ap-
plications business.
336 As noted in the Introduction, a group of dis-
tinguished amici consisting of Robert Litan, Roger Noll, William 
Nordhaus, and Frederic Scherer asked for a more far-reaching dives-
titure that, in addition to vertically separating the operating-system 
and applications businesses, also horizontally divides the operating 
system business into three competing firms.
337 Microsoft itself coun-
tered with a proposal for behavioral restrictions.
338  
After a short hearing and rapid briefing cycle, in which the 
court declined to hear testimony or to take further evidence on the 
remedies question, Judge Jackson adopted the government’s divesti-
ture proposal and ordered Microsoft to submit a plan of “reorgani-
zation” dividing the company vertically into two distinct firms.
339 At 
the time of this writing, the district court’s decision is pending en 
banc appellate review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
In the following sections, we apply the economic-welfare 
framework set out in Part II of this Article to the court’s divestiture 
order. We find that the record supporting the remedy is insufficient 
to show either that the remedy is reasonably likely to provide net 
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economic benefits or to provide greater benefits than alternative 
remedies. Moreover, we show why even the theoretical arguments 
in favor of vertical divestiture leave unaddressed important ques-
tions that cast doubt on the optimality of divestiture. Part IV.A.2 
then applies the welfare analysis to the most prominent proposal for 
an alternative structural remedy, the amicus filing by Litan et al, and 
finds that i t, too, leaves open basic questions that must at least be 
explored before that remedy’s absolute or comparative benefits can 
reasonably be judged.  
We cannot, from our analysis, determine what kind of remedy 
is best for resolving the Microsoft case. The data and analysis to 
support such a calculation mirror the very information that we ar-
gue is necessary (and missing) in the arguments supporting divesti-
ture. But we do conclude that neither the government nor the amici 
have met the burden of showing their respective remedies to be the 
best available from the standpoint of economic welfare. In the sec-
tions that follow, we will explain where we think the divestiture 
proposals contain gaps in their analyses that preclude reasonable as-
sessment of their individual or comparative effects on economic wel-
fare. 
A.  Structural Injunctions and Microsoft 
The fundamental case for divestiture is well summarized by 
Herbert Hovenkamp, a distinguished antitrust scholar and an ad-
viser to the states in the Microsoft litigation. He has argued that di-
vestiture is the only remedy that would end Microsoft’s alleged mo-
nopoly and produce competition in the operating systems market.
340 
He stated: “If the findings show significant abuse of monopoly 
power, then the appropriate remedy is to break up the monopoly—
not to hobble the company or try to regulate it.”
341 Divestiture is thus 
presented as the only way to remove both Microsoft’s incentive and 
ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct, and to avoid continu-
ing government oversight. Indeed, advocates of a Microsoft divesti-
ture along lines of “relevant markets” have attempted to establish in 
a principled way that (1) any optimal remedy must address Micro-
soft’s power in the operating systems market, because otherwise the 
company still has a monopoly that it has incentives to preserve; and 
(2) any behavioral remedy would be more intrusive than any struc-
tural remedy. On the first point, for example, Eliot L. Spitzer, the At-
torney General of New York and the lead plaintiff of the states in the 
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case, argued that Judge Jackson’s findings of fact focused the real 
problem on the operating system: “It’s an overwhelming opinion 
now that [the remedy] has to address their monopoly in operating 
systems.”
342 And on the second point, Steven Salop among others has 
argued that a conduct remedy, such as forcing the company to re-
write contracts or to modify its behavior, would be “too intrusive 
and regulatory.”
343  
Behavioral remedies—such as those suggested by Hal Varian of 
the University of California, Berkeley, Robert Hall of Stanford Uni-
versity, or Nicholas Economides of New York University—more 
modestly seek to address Microsoft’s  ability to engage in anticom-
petitive behavior. Stated differently, behavioral remedies concede 
that Microsoft’s incentive to maintain market power in the operating 
systems market would remain intact. Rather than “breaking up the 
monopoly,” behavioral remedies would seek to curb Microsoft’s 
ability to maintain its monopoly. Once it is decided that not only the 
ability, but also the incentive, to engage in anticompetitive activities 
must be eliminated, then behavior modifications cannot even be 
considered. As we will discuss below, however, it does not follow 
that all structural remedies eliminate the incentives to engage in 
anticompetitive activities. 
By apparently convincing Judge Jackson that Microsoft’s under-
lying incentives must be curbed, the government and supporting 
amici were able to point the remedial process in one direction—
namely, restoring competition in operating systems though divesti-
ture. In the following sections we analyze first the vertical divesti-
ture urged by the government and ordered by the district court. We 
then examine the more complete divestiture proposal filed by the 
amicus brief of Litan and others.  
1.  The court-ordered vertical divestiture. 
Under the district court’s order, Microsoft is required to restruc-
ture itself from a vertically integrated firm into two, non-rival com-
panies engaged in distinct yet complementary lines of business. One 
company would produce operating systems software,
344 and the sec-
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344  An operating system is best defined by Judge Jackson in his findings of fact:  
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ond would produce application programs.
345 Implicit in this divesti-
ture remedy is the notion that each company would be prohibited 
from engaging in the other principal lines of business to prevent any 
overlap or re-integration that divestiture was designed to eliminate. 
Accordingly, this proposed remedy is not purely structural but also 
includes behavioral constraints. As a starting point for our critique, 
it is important to note that the vertical divestiture ordered by the 
court would not directly alter Microsoft’s position in the operating 
systems market. Accordingly, it would leave in place the very mo-
nopoly power that the court found to create incentives for Microsoft 
to engage in anticompetitive actions. The remedy would instead re-
move M icrosoft’s ability to act on its incentives in the particular 
manner that the government alleged. And it would, in the govern-
ment’s view, spur competition over time in the operating systems 
market b ecause the newly independent applications company 
would now have the incentive to maximize its markets by writing 
programs that would run “cross platform” on operating systems 
other than Windows or other Microsoft products.
346  
a) Static efficiency gains. The first relevant point for the welfare 
analysis of vertical divestiture in this case pertains to the expected 
static gains for consumers. Would this form of vertical divestiture 
create better products or lower prices for consumers? The argument 
is that the independent applications company will have the incentive 
to make its products capable of running across multiple platforms 
and, indeed, to encourage the proliferation of such competing plat-
forms. As Carl Shapiro argued on the government’s behalf, the sup-
plier of an application benefits if the complementary operating sys-
tems on which it runs become less expensive.
347 This divested appli-
cations company, then, would theoretically act to erode the applica-
                                                                                                                                                      
“application programming interfaces,” or “APIs.” These are synapses at which the devel-
oper of an application can connect to invoke pre-fabricated blocks of code in the operat-
ing system. These blocks of code in turn perform crucial tasks, such as displaying text on 
the computer screen. Because it supports applications while interacting more closely with 
the PC system’s hardware, the operating system is said to serve as a “platform.”  
Findings of Fact, 84 F Supp 26 ¶ 2 (D DC 1999) 
345  The application programs market is sometimes also referred to as the “software for 
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tion aids, and personal productivity tools. See Chris E. Hall and Robert E. Hall, National Policy 
on Microsoft: A Neutral Perspective, Version 2.0 1 –2, available online at 
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tions programs that it sells in its Microsoft Office suite, namely Word (a word processing pro-
gram), Excel (a spreadsheet program), PowerPoint (a presentation aids program), Access (a 
database program), and Outlook (a contact manager, email-fax handler, and address book pro-
gram). Id.  
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tions barrier for potential new entrants into the operating systems 
market. Consumers would, in turn, benefit from competition b e-
tween Windows and these new entrants. 
 But there are reasons to be less than sanguine that such compe-
tition will develop through the efforts of an application company 
born of a vertically cleaved Microsoft. Making an application port-
able to non-Windows operating systems has costs. Only some appli-
cations may thus be ported, because the fixed costs of developing 
portability will initially have to be recouped from the comparatively 
thin base of users of the alternative operating system. Profitable op-
portunities for porting may thus be limited. It is unclear, then, that 
these limited incentives to encourage complementary product de-
velopment will cause applications developers to stimulate substan-
tial or meaningful competition among operating systems.  
Moreover, the applications company will have a choice between 
investing in porting an existing application beyond the dominant 
operating system or investing those same resources to develop a 
new application for the dominant platform. Depending on the rela-
tive costs, it could be more sensible for the applications company to 
develop something new that runs on Windows rather than making 
an existing application portable to Linux. In the event that the firm’s 
supply of necessary programming talent is limited—for example, by 
the current shortage of such skilled labor in the United States—even 
otherwise profitable investments in porting may be foregone in the 
near term. It is also unclear whether there are economies of scale in 
creating compatibility or portability. So, it is uncertain that many 
new applications would be written to run across platforms, and, 
even if they are so written, it must at least be considered that the ad-
ditional development costs imposed by such portability would de-
crease the pace of applications innovation as compared with devel-
opment of applications for a single platform.  
Therefore, before the government’s theory that the applications 
layer will stimulate competition at the operating system layer of the 
market can be accepted, some clearer idea is needed of the relative 
costs and benefits of portability versus new development for the 
dominant platform. And, the reduction in operating system prices 
that the applications company would expect from competition in 
that market must be included as part of that calculation. There has 
been substantial debate about the extent to which Microsoft engaged 
in monopoly pricing of Windows.  If the price of Windows has been 
close to the competitive level, the direct benefits to consumers will 
be less and applications providers will be less likely to gain from 
writing for new platforms or spurring competition among operating 
systems. Until the potential static price gains from competition (or 2000]  Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries  175 
the threat thereof) are determined, the incentives of the applications 
providers are unclear in the government’s model. The implications 
are twofold: First, the key comparative benefit of structural relief—
that it will eliminate underlying anticompetitive incentives—might 
well not materialize. And second, even if those incentives are elimi-
nated, the static gains to consumers are hard to gauge. The predicted 
reductions in price, increased choice of operating systems, and in-
creased production of applications software may either not appear 
or even run in the wrong direction, especially if there were cost effi-
ciencies to pre-divestiture integration or if the combined price of op-
erating systems and applications increases because of double mar-
ginalization, described above in Section II. In addition, whatever 
economies of scale Microsoft enjoyed would be lost through separa-
tion.
348 These risks may or may not be large, but they cannot be ig-
nored in making the case for divestiture. 
b) Dynamic efficiency. There is also an unexamined question in 
the district court’s remedy with regard to dynamic efficiencies. The 
linchpin of the vertical divestiture is the incentive the applications 
company will have to invite and create cross-platform portability 
and compatibility. Part of the benefit that the government argues 
will ensue is the static gain to consumers of lower prices for operat-
ing systems. But the other part of the predicted benefit involves in-
novation that will occur because a reduced applications barrier to 
entry will give entrepreneurs incentives to create new middleware 
and operating systems. As Paul Romer states in his declaration for 
the government, one of the key benefits sought by the government’s 
remedy is, through competition, to increase the rate of innovation in 
the software industry.
349 For reasons already discussed above, it is 
unclear from the government’s model what the incentives of appli-
cations providers will be upon vertical divestiture or what the effect 
of divestiture will be on the output of new applications software. But 
even assuming that OS competition develops and that the supply of 
applications software i ncreases, divestiture’s effect on innovation 
may be temporary and ambiguous. 
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The impact may be temporary because, even with compatibility 
across platforms, a firm may gain a decisive lead in the market if the 
costs of such compatibility are high and applications developers be-
gin to perceive the opportunity to write for an emerging market 
winner and thereby avoid those costs. The dynamic would become 
self-reinforcing between the complementary applications and oper-
ating-sytem products. So, it cannot be taken as given that simultane-
ous, as compared with sequential, competition at the operating sys-
tems level is a stable or optimal equilibrium. Yet that assumption is 
present in the arguments favoring divestiture.
350 
Second, the dynamic impact may be temporary because the 
court-ordered remedy will handicap one major player in the innova-
tion race: the Microsoft operating-systems company itself. To the ex-
tent that an “operating system” is an evolving product, the line-of-
business restrictions that prevent applications from being incorpo-
rated into Microsoft’s operating system would appear to put Micro-
soft at a disadvantage to other operating system producers. There 
may be in the view of some parties an appealing “rough justice” to 
that result given the district court’s findings. There is also an eco-
nomic argument that, to the extent Microsoft can still use its lead in 
the installed base to disadvantage competitors, the gains from new 
operating-systems would offset any chilled innovation by Microsoft. 
But two counterpoints need further examination before the limits on 
operating-system innovation by Microsoft itself are discounted.  
First, consumers may have to incur switching costs to move to a 
new operating system that contains desired innovations. If consum-
ers could obtain the same innovation without the switching costs, 
they would be better off. So, it must be more explicitly taken into ac-
count that any limits on Microsoft’s innovation will cost consumers, 
and only then can the net benefits of entry by new operating systems 
be properly assessed. Second, the degree of competition might in 
fact be better over time if Microsoft is allowed to develop Windows 
or another operating system without concern for the operating sys-
tem-applications boundary. Freezing the scope of the dominant 
technology might allow inferior firms to enter the market and gain 
an installed base, just by virtue of being permitted to include more 
functionality in their products. Should any such firm gain domi-
nance as a result of Microsoft’s line-of-business restriction, then it is 
unlikely that the cause of innovation will have been served. Even if 
such a firm does not succeed, consumers will still have been de-
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prived of one important source of applications innovation. The bene-
fits of the line-of-business restrictions might exceed the costs, but 
that claim must be carefully demonstrated, not merely assumed. It 
thus, again, bears consideration whether conduct remedies might 
achieve many of the dynamic benefits of vertical divestiture without 
running some of the risks. The tradeoffs may be hard to predict, but 
they cannot be assumed away if a reasonable case is to be made for a 
welfare-maximizing remedy. 
c) Administrative cost. Because the vertical divestiture does 
not directly eliminate Microsoft’s incentives to act anticompetitively, 
the district court’s remedy relies heavily on conduct requirements to 
reduce the operating-system company’s ability to follow those 
incentives. A second welfare-related observation about the district 
court’s remedy is thus that its administrative costs cannot be pre-
sumed to be lower than the costs of administering a purely behav-
ioral injunction. As the government’s own witnesses and the sup-
porting amici have all made clear, the efficacy of the court-ordered 
remedy depends upon numerous conduct provisions. The “interim” 
conduct remedies go to the heart of the violations  that the court 
found Microsoft to have committed: they force the integrated com-
pany to stop its anticompetitive actions pending divestiture and 
prohibit the operating systems company from resuming certain 
kinds of conduct to preserve its monopoly once divestiture is com-
plete.
351 With respect to limiting Microsoft’s  ability to act on mo-
nopolistic incentives, the court’s remedy would, for example, pre-
vent the operating systems company from: (1) directly tying its op-
erating system product to its own Internet product; (2) entering into 
exclusionary agreements that promote its own Internet browser 
product; and, (3) attempting to monopolize the Internet browser 
market. The very oversight and enforcement difficulties that a 
purely behavioral injunction would entail are thus present to some 
degree in the “structural” remedy ordered by the court. To the ex-
tent the structural remedy was sold in part as being easier to admin-
ister and less regulatory than a pure conduct remedy, the distinction 
may be weak or nonexistent.  
Indeed, the regulatory aspects of the court’s vertical divestiture 
order are critical to reaching an objective determination of whether 
divestiture is comparatively appropriate in this case. To begin with, 
numerous definitional issues will likely emerge as focal points for 
litigation. A lthough the product markets for operating systems, 
applications, and Internet services can generally be defined, it would 
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be complex to define with specificity the category of products that 
each d ivested company could or could not produce and sell.
352 It 
would be very difficult to find a principled basis for distinguishing 
application software functions from functions that may properly be 
considered, or incorporated into, an operating system.
353 Robert 
Litan has noted that “over the last ten years, [Microsoft has] ex-
panded [its] operating system over time to include more and more 
things that used to be called applications so that if we split the com-
pany in two at this point in time, we would potentially freeze tech-
nology.”
354  
It is, therefore, reasonable to think that under this divestiture 
proposal, the three companies would, like the Baby Bell companies 
in connection with the AT&T consent decree, constantly be in the 
position of petitioning the court to determine whether they could 
pursue the development of certain products or whether they could 
obtain a waiver of the line-of-business restrictions to sell certain 
products. This process would require the court continually to over-
see the decree. Indeed, the amicus brief of Litan and others raises 
precisely this concern in arguing that a more stringent divestiture 
than the one the court ordered is necessary. They argue that line-of-
business restrictions would have to be imposed on the operating sys-
tems company and that non-discrimination requirements would be 
necessary for the applications company.
 355 Both of these remedies 
would entail continuous monitoring (not to mention the definitional 
questions raised above). 
Because vertical divestiture neither eliminates anticompetitive 
incentives nor makes it less costly to stop the firm from acting on 
those incentives, it is not necessarily more effective than a conduct 
remedy. To be sure, the element of direct vertical control that can ex-
ist within a single corporation is absent, and the incentives of the 
applications company to cooperate with the operating-systems com-
pany might be different than under integration, but the theoretical 
advantage of structural relief over behavioral relief becomes much 
less obvious when it does not strike at the underlying incentives 
themselves or do away with regulatory oversight.
356   
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In sum, then, the remedy ordered by the district court leaves 
open several important questions. The record supporting the rem-
edy does not take into account the comparative costs and benefits of 
alternative structural and behavioral remedies sufficiently to know 
that vertical divestiture is the best option. Moreover, within each 
category of gains on which remedies should be compared—static, 
dynamic, and administrative efficiency—there are important gaps in 
the analysis that prevent a complete assessment of either the abso-
lute or comparative benefits of vertical divestiture of Microsoft. 
2.  The amicus “complete divestiture” proposal. 
The Litan et al amici filed a remedy proposal with the district 
court that evinced concern that the government’s vertical-divestiture 
proposal would neither eliminate Microsoft’s anticompetitive incen-
tives nor create competition in the operating systems market.
357 We 
will assume arguendo that the Litan amici are correct in their asser-
tion that a fundamental goal of antitrust remedies should be to in-
troduce competition where monopoly previously stood.
358 There are 
several respects in which the Litan proposal needs further elabora-
tion and evidence before it can be deemed the welfare-maximizing 
remedy choice. Litan and his colleagues clearly recognize that fact. 
They acknowledge that, while they believe their proposal to be the 
best one, a careful process of evidence and review is necessary be-
fore that conclusion can be confirmed.
359 Below we address some 
questions that their brief raises for a comparative welfare analysis of 
divestiture alternatives, and we identify some of the specific eviden-
tiary inquiries that a court would have to pursue before adopting the 
amicus proposal. 
                                                                                                                                                      
tracts with other providers of Internet browsers. Microsoft could potentially reach agreements 
with the companies owning Navigator and Internet Explorer, pursuant to which Microsoft 
would promise such companies the types of marketing advantages that it had offered ISPs and 
others in exchange for their agreement to make their systems proprietary to the Windows op-
erating system. This solution would not prevent software writers from writing applications to 
run on top of the browsers, nor would it prevent the evolution of server-based computing de-
livered through the Internet. 
357  Id at 1. 
358  We note only that the proposition is not self-evident, especially where network effects 
and Schumpeterian dynamics may lead to competition for a market, and not merely for mar-
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does not itself spark competition might be a different question. We agree that competition 
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The Litan proposal is that Microsoft should, first, divest verti-
cally in the manner ordered by the district court.
360 The operating 
systems company should then further divest horizontally into three 
identical, competing firms.
361 They call this remedy “full” divesti-
ture.
362 This remedy would thus directly end the operating system 
monopoly and thereby replace incentives to protect market power 
with incentives to compete for market share. This is an important 
distinction from the vertical divestiture that the court ordered, and 
moreover may create a greater difference between “full” divestiture 
and vertical divestiture than the difference that exists between verti-
cal divestiture and conduct remedies. But while the amicus proposal 
might resolve some of the potential flaws with the court-ordered re-
lief, it raises its own set of concerns that must be addressed before 
the economic-welfare effects of “complete” divestiture can be as-
sessed with sufficient confidence to order such relief. 
a) Static efficiency. The first question concerns the static gains 
to consumers. On one hand, the horizontal competition that would 
result from this type of break-up could lead to lower prices for the 
Windows operating system. On the other hand, however, this rem-
edy could fracture the Windows standard and dissipate the con-
sumer-side network externality. Although the new companies 
would all begin competing with the same operating system, over 
time they would be free to develop different, competing versions, 
which could eliminate the convenience that Microsoft has created 
with a single, standardized Windows operating system. Robert 
Litan, for example, has conceded that “a lot of consumers like the 
fact that there is only one effective operating system right now,” and 
“[t]hey don’t want to have to go shop for software that may only 
work on one of the operating systems and not both.”
363 
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If there are network effects and economies of scale in software 
production, those forces might drive consumers and software writ-
ers to embrace a single operating system—not three or more. The re-
sult could be (1) a rush by the competitors to standardize or other-
wise become compatible, (2) a battle for the market by competitors 
that r esults in the network’s “tipping” towards one of the three 
firms, or (3) product differentiation that fractures the network exter-
nality and harms consumers. The situation is not hypothetical. Con-
sider the trend recently exhibited by the Linux operating system. 
Currently, there are about fifteen English language versions of the 
Linux operating system for an Intel-based PC.
364 Although each ver-
sion is based on the same freely available source-code, the differ-
ences between versions are large enough that there is no guarantee 
that a commercial application for Linux will run on all of them.
365 To 
ensure that developers will be able to create applications for Linux 
that will install and execute on any of the Linux operating system 
versions, a Linux Standard Base committee has already been formed 
to define a standard set of guidelines and application programming 
interfaces.
366  
Steven Salop, Craig Romaine, and Robert Levinson have criti-
cized the thesis that the creation of multiple Windows OS companies 
would fragment the Windows operating system.
367 Given the enor-
mous installed base of the Windows operating system,
368 they argue 
that “[a]lthough the new Windows companies subsequently could 
choose to drastically deviate from this standard and create highly in-
compatible products, they are unlikely to do so.”
369 They first argue 
that network effects give consumers and developers a strong interest 
in maintaining a unitary Windows standard.
370 Because of switching 
costs, “unless a new operating system is significantly superior to 
Windows, a user would be unwilling to switch to it.”
371 They posit 
that the three competing Windows operating system companies 
would have incentives to remain compatible with each other because 
of the value that consumers and developers place on compatibility.
372 
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Otherwise, they argue, developers, sellers of computers, and con-
sumers would punish a company that deviated from the standard.
373  
Furthermore, the authors propose that the costs of developing 
applications that fit with the new Windows operating system prod-
ucts, porting costs, would remain low for various reasons: (1) the 
operating system products will be identical to start with,
374 so porting 
costs would not be an issue at the time of the breakup;
375 (2) each op-
erating system company would have strong incentives to be back-
wards-compatible with earlier versions of Windows products;
376 (3) 
each operating system company faces incentives for long-term com-
patibility, and because the standard APIs would not be rewritten, 
“only those few routines that benefit from the use of [each new OS 
company’s] proprietary extensions would be affected;”
377 (4) each 
operating system would start from the same common code base and 
a common hardware platform;
378and (5) the OS companies and stan-
dard-setting bodies would have incentives to coordinate their devel-
opment efforts.
379 They conclude that the “fragmentation criticism 
actually amounts to an attack on any remedy that causes operating 
system competition. It is competition, not the structural remedy, that 
allegedly leads to fragmentation.”
380  
Salop and his colleagues might be right, but there are important 
considerations to the contrary. First, the concern about fragmenta-
tion is not an attack on competition itself, particularly if competition 
is sequential rather than simultaneous. Indeed, the costs of fragmen-
tation and the network benefits from compatibility might be pre-
cisely what make the standard form of competition less likely than 
Schumpeterian competition in software markets. Simultaneous 
competition is great if it endures and produces benefits that offset 
any possible fragmentation costs. It may also, as Salop and his col-
leagues contend, create ways around the fragmentation problem. 
But it might not, especially if one of the three Windows companies 
gains a significant market lead. The concern about a court-ordered 
divestiture is that it could create fragmentation costs without any 
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offsetting benefits that endure long enough to compensate consum-
ers for the lost network externality.  
Second, a common code basis is no guarantee that a standard 
will not fragment. All it takes for fragmentation to become a concern 
(as it has for Linux, Unix, or Java) is for each new OS company to 
make a few scattered changes to the two million lines of code in 
Windows 2000. It is not necessarily the case that only “drastic” de-
partures from the Windows standard impose unacceptable costs. 
Rather, any risk that a program has departed from the standard re-
quires costly inquiries on the part of consumers and developers as to 
how far the departure has gone, and what its implications are.
381 A 
little bit of incompatibility can add up to drastic costs. 
Third, formal standard-setting bodies are unlikely to be of much 
help in formalizing the Windows standard. Such bodies are reluctant 
to make any systems with a significant proprietary component into 
standards. Java, for example, has not been adopted as an interna-
tional standard because key components of Java are copyrighted by 
Sun Microsystems—only about 30 percent of Java is in the public 
domain.
382 Only if a system is in the public domain, like the “C” pro-
gramming language, will a standards body be willing to take it over. 
What remains of the Salop argument is the theory that network 
effects—the high value that everyone places on having one stan-
dard—will be powerful enough to prevent fragmentation. The his-
tory of operating systems, however, shows that every system con-
trolled by more than one company has struggled with fragmenta-
tion. Unix, which began as one version of code and which had, and 
still has, an enormous installed base of users, fragmented into differ-
ent versions in the late 1980s despite massive efforts to standard-
ize.
383 As already mentioned, Linux faces worries about fragmenta-
tion, despite the strong incentives that would seem to exist to avoid 
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that result in order to foster applications development.
384 Java devel-
opers also worry about fragmentation, their concerns heightened by 
Sun’s decision to abandon its efforts to work with official standards 
bodies to provide a Java standard; Sun will continue to police Java 
compatibility itself through its copyrights, despite opposition from 
other developers, including IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Microsoft, 
which have threatened to move forward with their own version.
385 
There is at least some good evidence to suggest that network effects 
might well not be enough to maintain the standard in the case of the 
Microsoft operating system. 
The fragmentation suffered by Unix, Java, and Linux has not 
been fatal, and those competitors have continued to be viable in the 
market. Fragmentation reflects a trade-off between innovation and 
standardization; there are benefits from fragmentation as well as in-
creased costs. But there is a difference between letting that trade-off 
be made in the marketplace and making it by court order or regula-
tion. Windows is a dominant operating system today in part because 
it offers consumers the benefits of opting out of the “fragmentation” 
problem. Depriving the market of that alternative is not something 
to be done without careful analysis of offsetting benefits.  
A second concern raised by the Litan proposal involves produc-
tive efficiencies. Even if fragmentation does not deprive consumers 
of interoperability, that interoperability might come at a cost. As 
Litan has himself stated, horizontal division of the operating systems 
business might “slow down the development of application 
software because those applications guys are going to have to write 
three or four versions [one for each] operating system.”
386 For exam-
ple, in designing a browser to work across different platforms, de-
velopers would have to incur a number of different types of costs: 
Netscape engineers found that doing cross-platform develop-
ment well requires minimizing several costs, or “penalties.” 
One is the additional time and human effort needed to create 
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abstracted, cross-platform code. A second involves tailoring at 
least some code for different platforms which is almost always 
necessary. And a third comes from testing and debugging, as 
engineers spend extra time making sure features work properly 
on different platforms.
387 
One way to avoid the problem of degraded interoperability would 
be to allow competitors in the operating systems market to collabo-
rate on the promulgation of vendor-neutral standards, such as 
TCP/IP.
388 For example, all the new vertically integrated firms could 
agree on the comparability of the operating system and so compete 
on the basis of one common standard.  
Of course, the recommendation to allow collaborative standard 
setting among competitors in the operating system market would in-
troduce its own set of antitrust questions: A substantial body of law 
exists on the question of whether standard setting among horizontal 
competitors enhances efficiency and benefits consumer welfare or 
instead facilitates collusion or the exclusion of entrants.
391 It would 
be wrong to assume that collaborative standard setting on subse-
quent versions of the Windows operating system (or its successor) 
would be out of reach of public or private antitrust litigation. Even if 
such standard settings were genuinely competitively neutral, the 
opportunity for strategic, private antitrust litigation would exist. 
b) Dynamic efficiency. Finally, there are fundamental questions 
about the effect on innovation and dynamic efficiency that could be 
expected from the Litan amicus proposal of complete divestiture. If 
the Windows standard stays coherent enough not to impose costs on 
consumers, competition among the newly formed OS competitors 
will arguably create static price benefits for consumers. But such co-
hesion might well exacerbate rather than reduce the applications 
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barrier to entry for non-Windows operating systems. If applications 
providers know that the biggest return will come from writing for 
Windows, and that there is little price reduction in operating sys-
tems to be had from entry by other (non-Windows) system produc-
ers (price reductions that would increase demand for complemen-
tary applications), then it is unclear that innovation outside the 
Windows platform will be helped by complete divestiture. Put an-
other way, if the remedy merely replaces the Windows monopoly 
with a Windows oligopoly that sells operating systems at lower 
prices, then the benefits for non-Windows operating systems seem 
improbable. Depending on the costs of creating portability, then, the 
effect of the Litan amicus proposal on the applications barrier to en-
try is not certain to be positive.  
If, on the other hand, the Windows standard fractures, then one 
of two things may happen. As already discussed, consumers might 
suffer a loss of network benefit, but they might receive a compensat-
ing benefit in the form of innovation by new entrants into the 
operating system and middleware markets. On the other hand, one 
Windows company might gain a lead and reconstitute the very net-
work monopoly that divestiture was designed to end. That result is 
not necessarily bad, because the interim competition might lead to a 
much better and less expensive product. But, at a minimum, the rela-
tionship between fragmentation, standardization, and dynamic 
benefits warrants further consideration before a complete divestiture 
remedy could be reasonably adopted in Microsoft. 
c) Administrative costs. Finally, the administrative costs of the 
Litan et al proposal are unlikely to be negligible. The amici note that 
their remedy will entail “some minimum conduct restraints during 
the near term.”
392 These conduct restraints pertain to recombination 
among the four companies created by full divestiture, non-
discrimination in licensing, limits on hiring employees from other 
“WinCos,” and cross-ownership among the four companies by top 
management.
393 Even if one assumes these conduct restraints can be 
efficiently and effectively enforced, however, the complete divesti-
ture proposal also requires the very difficult initial task of dividing 
the Windows company into comparable thirds. If this task were not 
well accomplished, much of the remedy’s force would be lost. On 
the other hand, in an industry where, as the amici themselves ar-
gue,
394 the important assets are “informational” and i ntellectual 
rather than tangible, the lines along which a company should be 
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horizontally divided are more difficult to discern. Administering 
this initial division could entail protracted and heavy costs that 
should not be ignored in comparing remedies. 
In sum, Litan et al propose an interesting remedy worthy of 
careful consideration. But, despite the detailed argument they pre-
sent, and the e fforts they make to place “complete divestiture in 
comparative perspective with alternative remedies,” the amici none-
theless leave out important considerations that must be addressed 
before the case for their proposal is complete. Litan et al. themselves 
recognize this point. They describe their proposal as a “sketch”
395 
and make an observation with which we wholly agree: “only careful 
and thorough review of this and the prominent alternative remedy 
proposals . . . can provide sufficient supporting detail to assure the 
court that this (or indeed any) remedy proposal is best suited to 
meet the major remedy goals.”
396 The district court did not engage in 
such a process, with the result that neither the absolute nor 
comparative economic welfare effects of the remedy it adopted, or of 
any other remedy before the court, has been sufficiently assessed. 
V.  THE AT&T DIVESTITURE AS A MODEL FOR MICROSOFT 
Before Microsoft, the most recent use of antitrust law to restruc-
ture an American industry was the government’s lawsuit against 
AT&T that culminated in the 1982 settlement leading to the breakup 
of the Bell System in 1984. Implicitly and explicitly, the Bell breakup 
has been touted as the blueprint for Microsoft, so much so that 
pieces resulting from the company’s proposed divestiture have been 
dubbed “Baby Bills” after the “Baby Bells.”
397 Professors Litan, Noll, 
Nordhaus, and Scherer urged in their amicus brief:  
To the extent that the Court . . . sees a structural remedy as pre-
senting greater risks than a conduct decree, we believe that it 
can learn from, and be comforted by, the extensive experience 
that has been gained in other markets that have been deregu-
lated over the past two decades, or where structural antitrust 
relief has been imposed (notably, in the case of the breakup of 
AT&T).
398  
They regard the AT&T divestiture as the primary cause of a host of 
beneficial developments: 
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[C]ritics of the AT&T breakup have been proved wrong at vir-
tually every turn. The breakup now is widely acknowledged to 
have unleashed powerful forces of competition in long-distance 
telephone markets; to have induced policy makers to recognize 
(in the Telecommunications Act of 1996) that not even local tele-
phone service is subject to natural monopoly; and perhaps most 
important, to have a ccelerated innovation in telecommu-
nications, especially in the rapid technical development and 
deployment of fiber optic cable that has facilitated the rapid 
growth of the Internet.
399 
Before the AT&T divestiture is casually taken to support similar 
remedies in other cases and other industries, it is worth examining 
more critically the arguments in the excerpt quoted above. We think 
the above-quoted assessment is too sanguine and that courts should 
be uneasy about using the AT&T divestiture as a model for formu-
lating remedies in the Microsoft, or any other, case. Our point is not 
that the MFJ’s net effects were harmful or that the decree was in 
some way a failure compared with the alternatives for relief in that 
case.
400 The substantial debate on those issues is outside the scope of 
this Article. Rather, our point is that, even if the MFJ did produce net 
benefits, it also entailed very high, unanticipated costs. The AT&T 
case shows not only that the predictions of antitrust litigants and 
judges about the future of a technologically dynamic industry are of-
ten wrong, but also that enforcing and interpreting a complex decree 
can be administratively costly and potentially harmful to consumer 
welfare. The prospect of such costs counsels more caution than com-
fort in adopting a structural remedy, and requires that a compelling 
case be made for the benefits that society can expect from such relief. 
A.  The Antitrust Suit 
In 1974 the Department of Justice brought suit against AT&T,
401 
arguing that AT&T had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by us-
ing its dominant position in telephone equipment and local e x-
change service to monopolize the markets for long-distance tele-
communications and telephone equipment. The government argued 
that AT&T had systematically refused interconnection to its long-
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distance competitors,
402 had abused the regulatory process in pro-
tecting its monopoly,
403 and had engaged in predatory pricing in 
long-distance markets.
404 The Department of Justice was concerned 
that such predation could continue b ecause cross-subsidies could 
flow from the local telephone m onopolies to long-distance ser-
vices.
405 
The suit ended with a consent decree finalized in 1984.
406 This 
decree, known as the Modification of Final Judgment (“MFJ”),
407 im-
posed both structural and behavioral constraints on AT&T. The 
principal structural component was vertical divestiture on a massive 
scale. Before divestiture, AT&T consisted of three main parts: (1) lo-
cal exchange companies that provided about 80 percent of U.S. local 
telephone service; (2) AT&T Long Lines, providing almost all U.S. 
long-distance service; and (3) Western Electric, including Bell Labo-
ratories, which provided research and manufacturing of almost all 
AT&T’s equipment.
408 The MFJ required AT&T to divest itself of its 
local exchange operations, from which were created seven new re-
gional Bell operating companies (“RBOCs”).
409 These were Ameri-
tech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern 
Bell, and US West. To create the RBOCs, AT&T was required to 
transfer assets to the RBOCs
410 and give them “on a royalty-free ba-
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sis, all existing patents and all patents issued for a period of five 
years following approval of the proposed decree,”
411 as well as other 
technical information. 
The theory behind the divestiture was that AT&T could, absent 
such a remedy, use revenues from monopoly local exchange service 
to cross-subsidize activities in other markets.
412 The RBOCs, having 
been divested from AT&T, were thus barred from entering the long-
distance service or information services markets,
413 and from manu-
facturing or selling telephone equipment.
414 The RBOCs were, more-
over, required to provide every long-distance carrier equal access to 
local exchange networks.
415  
 The decree contained several mechanisms for adjustment of its 
provisions over time. One such mechanism was a triennial review of 
the line-of-business restrictions on the RBOCs.
416 Because of a series 
of appeals to the D.C. Circuit and subsequent remands to Judge 
Greene’s court, the first triennial review was still not completed in 
1993, when the third review was due. The second triennial review 
never took place.
417 
A second adjustment mechanism was the MFJ’s waiver process 
by which the RBOCs could request the court’s permission to enter 
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new markets and be relieved of their line-of-business restrictions. 
Under Section VIII(C) of the decree, the RBOCs were entitled to have 
a particular line-of-business restriction lifted if they could show that 
“there [was] no substantial possibility” that a RBOC could use its 
monopoly power to impede competition in the market that it pro-
posed to enter.
418 When a modification of the MFJ was uncontested, 
Section VII of the decree governed, and the modification was to be 
granted if it was found to be in the “public interest” (that is, consis-
tent with the Tunney Act).
419  
B.   Costs and Benefits of the MFJ 
The decree is often credited with furthering the growth of com-
petition in long-distance services. Since 1984, residential rates have 
fallen from around thirty-five or forty cents per minute to dis-
counted prices of five cents. Average prices for long-distance service 
have fallen at least 50 percent between 1984 and the present.
420 In 
addition, competition among long-distance providers after divesti-
ture led to rapid deployment of fiber optic cable that later formed 
the infrastructure capable of handling the explosion of data traffic 
sparked by the Internet.  
While these benefits are substantial, we note two things. First, it 
is likely that some of those benefits would have resulted 
notwithstanding the MFJ. Fiber deployment, for example, began 
prior to the MFJ. Although it would likely have proceeded more 
slowly absent the decree’s equal access rule that opened up long-
distance markets, the “fiber revolution” was under way prior to the 
decision to break up the Bell System.
421 For another example, the 
decline in long-distance prices is at least partly attributable to 
regulatory decisions by the FCC relating to subsidy flows from long-
distance to local service. The FCC “rebalanced” local and long-
distance rates by creating a “subscriber line charge” (“SLC”) on 
consumers’ local bills to replace subsidies taken from long-distance 
revenues. The effect of the SLC was to raise the customer’s monthly 
bill for exchange access and enable long-distance carriers to reduce 
rates accordingly.
422 In addition, at least some of the long-distance 
price change is attributable not to the AT&T divestiture but to the 
FCC’s decision to reduce a ccess charges that long-distance 
companies pay to local carriers.
423 Indeed, the FCC imposed price                                                                                                                                                        
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deed, the FCC imposed price caps on the Bell operating companies in 
their sale of access to interexchange carriers transporting interstate toll 
calls. The effect of that policy was to force down over time the cost of 
the largest single input used by the interexchange carriers in the sup-
ply of interstate long-distance service. That reduction in cost reduced 
long-distance prices, though not by as great a percentage as costs 
fell.
424 More generally,  Robert Crandall has argued that vertical 
divestiture was not a necessary condition for the growth of 
competition, and notes that it therefore was rejected by Canada in 
bringing competition to its own telephone service sector.
425 
Second, the MFJ had costs, even if one thinks those costs were 
eventually offset. Consider first the administrative burdens of the 
decree; it is particularly important to consider the waiver process 
noted above. In 1993, the average waiver request had been pending 
for thirty-six months, although the Department of Justice opposed 
relief in only 4 of the 266 requests. By 1994, the period had grown to 
48.3 months, though 96 percent of all waiver requests that had been 
ruled on had been approved by the court.
426  
Another category of costs involves inefficiencies of the line-of-
business restrictions on the RBOCs, which reduced competition in 
long-distance telecommunications and in telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing by excluding the RBOCs from those mar-
kets.
427 Jerry Hausman has shown empirically that consumer welfare 
fell by billions of dollars per year because these restrictions delayed 
the introduction of new telecommunications services. For example, 
the price of cellular long-distance service fell by about 25 percent 
when the MFJ’s restrictions were finally r emoved.
428 These costs 
must be taken into account in assessing the MFJ’s lessons for future 
cases.  
Not all the benefits of the post-divestiture era can thus be tied to 
the divestiture decree. And the decree must also be charged with 
some costs, some of which are counterfactual and easy to overlook 
or dismiss. But even if the decree produced net benefits, and even if 
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those benefits could be tied to resolution of the government’s anti-
trust case, the correct comparison for remedial purposes is not be-
tween the post-divestiture era and the monopoly era, but between 
the post-divestiture era and what would have resulted under alterna-
tive remedies. That counterfactual analysis is hard to do, but it might 
well lead to a very different assessment of whether the MFJ is a wel-
come or a warning for similar relief in Microsoft. 
VI.  UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH 
TO REMEDIES 
After the drama of the Microsoft trial, two puzzling questions 
linger concerning the remedial phase of the case. The first concerns 
the mapping of the government’s theory of liability into a theory of 
remedies: Why did the government’s ultimate request for permanent 
injunctive relief bear no resemblance to its initial request for pre-
liminary injunctive relief? The government requested in its motion 
for preliminary injunction that Microsoft provide Netscape’s web 
browser, Navigator, mandatory access (at an unspecified price) to 
the Windows platform.
429 Yet the Department of Justice did not seek 
to enjoin preliminarily the other acts by Microsoft that eventually 
formed the very foundation of the government’s theory of the case. 
Given the government’s ultimate decision to propose divesti-
ture as the permanent injunctive remedy in the Microsoft case, why 
did the government not pursue with greater clarity and vigor a pre-
liminary injunctive remedy to stem the putative tide of consumer 
welfare losses upon which the divestiture of Microsoft is predicated? 
Stated differently, why did the preliminary remedy sought by the 
government ultimately bear little relationship to its subsequent the-
ory of the case.  
Second, why did the government not seek a broader, compara-
tive i nquiry at the remedies phase of the trial, or itself give more 
complete public consideration to alternative resolutions? For exam-
ple, why did the government exclude the possibility of monetary 
remedies from its theory of the case? One possible explanation is the 
belief that Judge Jackson lacked the authority to order damages (or a 
fine of equivalent magnitude) in the government’s civil case against 
Microsoft. Similarly, one might argue, the availability of equitable 
remedies such as disgorgement and restitution is unclear in light of 
the fact that the government’s cause of action is based on the civil 
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provisions of the Sherman Act or similar state antitrust statues, and 
not general principles of equity. 
This explanation, however, is not entirely satisfactory either as a 
matter of law or of public policy. As a matter of antitrust law, courts 
have observed that restitution might be an appropriate remedy in 
certain cases. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for 
example, observed in 1999 that “a typical restitution or disgorge-
ment scenario might fit within the contours of § 16 [of the Clayton 
Act], such as where plaintiffs seek to deprive antitrust violators of 
the benefits of their illegal conduct.”
430 Moreover, although the gov-
ernment in the Microsoft case did not expressly request a monetary 
remedy in its prayer for relief, its complaint nonetheless did ex-
pressly pray the court to “enter such additional relief as it may find 
just and proper.”
431 The Supreme Court has likened the remedy of 
divestiture to the remedy of restitution.
432 It is not clear why “just 
and proper” relief of undefined form should encompass divestiture 
but not restitution. 
As a matter of policy, if, as nearly every observer maintains, the 
Microsoft case is the most portentous antitrust case in several dec-
ades, then an innovative use of a monetary remedy should have 
been a ctively considered rather than dismissed out of hand. The 
shortcomings inherent in the various injunctive remedies proposed 
in the Microsoft case counsel one to reconsider seriously the efficacy 
and feasibility of monetary remedies. Such remedies are not limited 
to “damages,” strictly speaking. To an economist, all monetary 
remedies look alike, whether they are called damages, fines, restitu-
tion, disgorgement, or something else. All of these monetized reme-
dies are a way of posting the “price” to the defendant (and other 
prospective parties) of committing the conduct in question. This 
view may be ascribed to the contemporary law and economics 
movement,
433 but it also is found in the writings of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes more than a century ago.
434  
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Clearly, it is not beyond the competence of courts and econo-
mists to produce and weigh estimates of an appropriate monetary 
remedy in the Microsoft case. Professor Robert Hall of Stanford Uni-
versity produced a novel theoretical model with which he has calcu-
lated damages as a remedy in the Microsoft case.
435 Reasonable minds 
might disagree over whether his model bears sufficient relation to 
the actual facts of the Microsoft case to be a useful tool in its current 
form. But even if it is not, Hall’s damage model is a useful starting 
point for an important analysis. As Philip Areeda noted years ago in 
a frequently cited article, there exists the anomalous possibility in 
antitrust cases of “antitrust violations without damage recoveries.”
436 
In an argument similar to Baxter’s Axiom, Areeda argued that “an 
antitrust damage assessment cannot be divorced from thoughtful at-
tention to the rationale for liability and the internal logic of the liabil-
ity holding.”
437 A monetary damage analysis would invite Judge 
Jackson and the parties to focus on an attempt to quantify the harm 
to consumers that has been alleged to flow from Microsoft’s con-
duct.
438 
Damages are only an example of the truncated analysis that ap-
pears at the remedial stage of the Microsoft case. More generally, the 
case presents both the need and opportunity for a careful examina-
tion of remedies in network industries, especially industries with the 
particular cost and asset characteristics of the software industry. In-
deed, for products whose development costs are very high but 
whose production and distribution costs are negative, and for firms 
whose principal assets are intellectual and informational rather than 
physical, both the measures of antitrust liability and the effects of 
antitrust remedies may differ from those that appear in more con-
ventional markets. There is thus a need for carefully considered anti-
trust precedent in the “new economy,” and Microsoft would seem to 
be a case in which the government would have wanted the court to 
create such precedent. Yet there was little effort by the government 
systematically and publicly to weigh the various conduct and struc-
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tural remedies proposed by different parties and commentators. 
Without basis in a careful, on-the-record assessment and comparison 
of alternative remedies, the result in Microsoft will not only be of 
questionable virtue in the instant case, but also of little value for 
similar cases that might arise in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The landmark case against Microsoft is the U.S. government’s 
most significant monopolization case since the breakup of the Bell Sys-
tem in 1982 and the first major antitrust case concerning the “New 
Economy” created by the phenomenal growth of the Internet. In this 
Article, we propose an economic-welfare approach to evaluating 
remedial alternatives not only in Microsoft, but in all antitrust cases 
involving network industries and other dynamic markets. We show 
that even where anticompetitive conduct has been found to occur, it 
does not follow that a particular remedy for that conduct would 
yield a net increase in economic welfare. To determine whether a 
remedy is likely to benefit consumers and long-run economic wel-
fare, the remedy must be shown to produce a net increase in the sum 
of three kinds of efficiency: allocative, productive, and dynamic. To 
justify a specific remedy, it does not suffice to show merely that the 
remedy would reduce prices in the 197  The University of Chicago Law Review  
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short run or create market opportunities for a particular group of 
competitors. A case must instead be made that price declines will 
offset any production cost increases or losses in consumer-side net-
work externalities; that the net gain from such price reductions will 
not entail offsetting costs in the form of inefficiently reduced innova-
tion incentives; and that the remaining net gains cannot be achieved 
at a lower cost through an alternative remedial plan. 
When the foregoing framework is applied to the remedial pro-
posals pending before the court in Microsoft, we find that important 
gaps are revealed. There are important strengths, but potentially fa-
tal weaknesses, in the divestiture proposals offered by the govern-
ment and some amici curiae. Those proposals cannot be responsibly 
adopted unless those weaknesses can be addressed and their poten-
tially negative implications for economic welfare demonstrated to be 
offset by other economic gains that flow uniquely from divestiture. 
 